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Enforcement of Anti-pollution Regulations in the
Watershed
Introduction
On January 21, 1997, representatives of thirty-eight
towns,' seven counties, 2 three state agencies,3 the City of
1. The following towns joined the Watershed Agreement: Andes, Bovina,
Colchester, Delhi, Deposit, Franklin, Hamden, Harpershield, Kortright, Mason-
ville, Meredith, Middletown, Roxbury, Sidney, Stamford, Tompkins, Walton,
Ashland, Halcott, Hunter Jewett, Lexington, Prattsville, Windham, Carmel,
Putnam Valley, Kent, Southeast, Patterson, Broome, Conesville, Gilboa, Jeffer-
son, Fallsburgh, Liberty Neversink, Denning, Hardenburgh, Hurley, Kingston,
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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New York (City), the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and five private environmental groups4
signed an historic agreement intended to protect New York
City's water supply from contamination. 5 The Watershed
Agreement (Agreement) was reached after more than two
years of delicate negotiations. It requires New York City to
invest $1.2 billion to purchase land, upgrade sewage treat-
ment plants and septic systems, implement stormwater man-
agement techniques, and foster environmentally benign
economic development within the Watershed. In exchange,
communities surrounding the Watershed agreed to drop liti-
gation aimed at derailing the City's regulatory and land
acquisition programs. Additionally, the Watershed Commu-
nities agreed to support promulgation of regulations
designed to control pollution and development inside the
2000 square mile Watershed.
For its part, the EPA agreed to indefinitely waive a fed-
eral order under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 6 which would
have required the City to build a multi-billion dollar water
Marbletown, Olive, Rochester, Shandaken, Wawarsing, Woodstock, Bedford,
Cortlandt, Harrison, Lewisboro, Mount Kisco, Mt. Pleasant, New Castle, North
Castle and North Salem. The following Villages are also signatories to the Wa-
tershed Agreement: Andes, Delhi, Fleischmanns, Hobart, Margaretville, Stam-
ford, Walton, Hunter, Tannersville and Brewster. See New York City
Watershed Memorandum of Agreement, Jan. 21, 1997, Attachment A [hereinaf-
ter NYC Watershed Memorandum of Agreement] (on file with author).
2. All seven counties that contain portions of the Watershed signed the
Agreement: Delaware, Greene, Putnam, Schoharie, Sullivan, Ulster and West-
chester. See id.
3. The New York State Departments of Environmental Conservation,
Health and State all signed the Watershed Agreement. See id.
4. The following environmental groups were parties to the Watershed
Agreement: Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc., New York Public Interest Re-
search Group, the Catskill Center for Conservation and Development, Inc.,
Open Space Institute, Inc., and the Trust for Public Land. See id. at Attach-
ment B.
5. See id.
6. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1994), amended
by Act of Aug.6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, §§ 101-501, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 110
Stat. 1613-19 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300fet seq.). Under the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, the EPA promulgated what is commonly known as the Surface
Water Treatment Rule (SWTR). 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.71 - 141.75 (1996). Under
the SWTR, water suppliers such as New York City who rely upon reservoirs,
lakes and rivers for their primary drinking water supply must either plan for
3
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filtration plant.7 City officials praised the new regulations,"
predicting that the rules would empower the City to confine
most new development to existing Watershed hamlets while
protecting wetlands, and stream and reservoir buffers from
disturbance and preserve vast stretches of open countryside
critical to water quality. The regulations went into effect in
April 1997, when the City made the first payments due under
the Agreement for infrastructure improvements in upstate
communities.
Although the new regulations provide the City with
broad powers to control development, there is no requirement
that the City actually exercise that power. Indeed, environ-
mentalists and water consumers are concerned that after
having successfully negotiated the highly celebrated Water-
shed Agreement, and thereby temporarily dodging the filtra-
tion bullet, the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP or department)9 will drift back into the century-old
filtration of that supply or design adequate watershed protection plans which
meet filtration avoidance criteria set by the EPA. See id.
7. See NYC Watershed Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 1, attach-
ment LL (Draft Filtration Avoidance Determination). The staggering cost of
constructing a filtration plant for the Catskill/Delaware water supply system
has been variously estimated at between six and eight billion dollars with an
annual maintenance bill of between $300 and $500 million. See Loft Corp. v.
City of New York, July 1, 1997, N.Y. L.J 36 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (stating that
although no precise estimate exists, it has been reported that the plant would
cost $6 to $8 billion "plus a substantial amount for annual operation").
8. NEW YORK CITY, NY, THE RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE PROTECTION FROM CONTAMINATION, DEGRADATION AND
POLLUTION OF THE NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY AND ITS SOURCES. v. 5, ch. 18
(1997). Subchapter C of the new regulations enumerates Watershed activities
over which the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or department)
has regulatory authority. Among other things, within the Watershed, the City
may control the introduction of pathogens, prohibit new hazardous waste facili-
ties, exclude the storage of radioactive materials or petroleum products, restrict
home heating oil tanks, prohibit new sewage treatment facilities and place
stricter effluent controls on existing plants, control the location, type and
dimensions of new septic systems, require stormwater pollution prevention
plans for virtually every new development, control pesticide and fertilizer use
and manage snow removal and salt storage facilities. See id. at §§ 18-31 to 18-
45.
9. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE AND CITY CHARTER tit. 24, § 302.
This section of the City Charter sets out the duty of the Commissioner of DEP
stating, "It shall be the duty of the Commissioner to preserve the purity of all
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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lethargy that allowed water quality to deteriorate in the first
place. 10 It remains clear to all of those who participated in
the Watershed negotiations that the Agreement will only pro-
tect water quality if the DEP is vigilant in enforcing compli-
ance with the new regulations. Indeed, the DEP, and the
City as a whole, must formulate and pursue an entirely new
vision-one that is singularly committed to Watershed pro-
tection through the preservation of open landscapes.
With this in mind, Riverkeeper wrote this Article about
the DEP in the spring of 1996, and presented it to City offi-
cials in August 1996.11 At that time, the DEP was in transi-
tion. Commissioner Marilyn Gelber was leaving and her
successor, Joel Miele, had just been selected. Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani's First Deputy Mayor, Peter Powers, who had guided
the City's team through two difficult years and developed im-
portant relationships with upstate environmental groups,
was leaving his position for the private sector. Perhaps most
significantly, William Stasiuk, who was appointed Deputy
Commissioner of the DEP in charge of the Bureau of Water
Supply, Quality and Protection (Bureau), promised to re-
create the Bureau in preparation for its new role as Water-
shed protector.
Riverkeeper delivered a copy of this Article to Deputy
Mayor Peter Powers and to Elizabeth St. Claire, legal counsel
to the DEP through the New York City Law Department.
Both Powers and St. Claire took the Article seriously and ex-
pressed grave concerns regarding its allegations of criminal
activity, malfeasance and examples of an institutional cul-
ture of mismanagement. Powers, who demonstrated that he
waters from which any part of the City Water supply is drawn, and to protect
such supply and the lands adjacent thereto from injury or nuisance." Id.
10. The City did not enforce its archaic 1953 Watershed regulations, which
affected such activities as the "deposit, storage and disposal of human excreta"
until 1990, at which time Commissioner Al Appleton announced his intention to
enforce the regulations. Loft Corp. v. New York City, July 1, 1997, N.Y.L.J. 36
at col. 5.
11. This Article is not intended to denigrate any person, but to serve an
important function-to inform the public and hold public employees accounta-
ble for their actions. Riverkeeper's purpose is to hold this bureaucracy respon-
sible, to recognize and applaud good behavior and expose the bad behavior.
1997] 237
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had carefully read the Article with a detailed discussion of its
contents, expressed that the Mayor was deeply concerned
about the DEP failings. Powers characterized the DEP as the
worst managed of all the City departments as well as the
toughest to reorganize due to its size, funding structure 12 and
myopic institutional culture as described by this Article.
Powers informed Riverkeeper that in order to reform the
DEP, Mayor Giuliani had appointed Joel Miele as the new
commissioner of the City agency. 13
The factual content of this Article has been carefully
checked for accuracy by Riverkeeper. Copies of this Article
have been provided to Commissioner Miele and Deputy Com-
missioner William Stasiuk with the request that they circu-
late the Article among the DEP staff, particularly those
persons mentioned in the Article, and notify Riverkeeper of
any factual inaccuracies. The report has been available to
the DEP for over one year and has been widely circulated
among water protection staff.14 Not a single factual inaccu-
racy has been reported to the author.1 5
12. The DEP is the only self-funded City department. Its budget comes
from water rates rather than City taxes. Self-funding gives the department an
independence and lack of accountability absent in other City departments.
13. Telephone Interview with Peter Powers, deputy mayor of the City of
New York (September 1996).
14. The inaugural issue of Riverkeeper's new publication Inside DEP, un-
veiled simultaneously with the publication of this Article, assesses the DEP af-
ter eighteen months under Commissioner Miele's leadership. Riverkeeper will
publish Inside DEP every six months. Our contact number is (914) 422-4343 for
Mark Sullivan or Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. Confidentiality is assured.
Riverkeeper will seek out and publish information that shows significant ac-
complishments of the DEP and its staff. The Riverkeeper staff is particularly
interested in publishing accounts of improvements in staff members whose con-
duct has been criticized in earlier reports. In this way, we hope to encourage
positive change at the DEP. We want to thank the many courageous DEP em-
ployees who contributed to this Article. These men and women understand and
believe in their central mission-to assure safety of the drinking water of half
the state's population. We earnestly hope that our next issue has nothing but
praise for the DEP, its leadership and all of its employees.
15. On September 19, 1997, the author sent a letter to Dr. William Stasiuk,
Deputy Commissioner of DEP and Director of the Bureau of Water Supply
Quality and Protection, by FAX and by mail, seeking any comments that Dr.
Stasiuk and the rest of the DEP may have had regarding this Article. This let-
ter was followed up with a phone call by Riverkeeper staff informing Dr.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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Executive Summary
Though weak regulations are frequently cited as a princi-
ple cause of the decline in New York City's water quality, a
far larger problem is poor management and little sense of
mission within the DEP, the agency responsible for safe-
guarding the supply. The Watershed's most notorious histor-
ical disasters-the sedimentation catastrophes caused by
IBM in Somers, the Somers Golf Course and Pepsico in
Katonah, the construction of the Westchester Airport on the
banks of the Kensico Watershed, the issuance of permits al-
lowing direct sewage discharges by Putnam County Hospital
into the new Croton Reservoir, toxic discharges by Danbury
Pharmacol into the Croton system, and untreated sewage
and animal blood at the Kortwright Sludge Pit-all violated
existing regulations at the time they occurred. Each of these
was the product, not of weak regulation, but of poor adminis-
tration. The same can be said about most of the less famous
insults to water quality. Chronic noncompliance of one-third
of the Watershed's sewage treatment plants is attributable to
poor enforcement, inept management and lack of agency
oversight-not inadequate regulations.
The DEP's management and mission problems flow from
an institutional culture entrenched in ossified DEP power
centers that emphasize civil engineering and water delivery
to the detriment of water quality and enforcement. Succes-
sive DEP commissioners failed to segregate the agency's op-
erational engineering (water delivery) and facility
management functions from its often antagonistic enforce-
ment and pollution prevention functions. This has assured
the continued dominance of these units by hostile water de-
livery engineers and managers and, ultimately, the failure of
environmental protection in the New York City Watershed.
By the 1980s, once the proud figurehead of the DEP's
engineering glory, 16 upstate Sources Division (or Division)
Stasuik of the need for a response to this piece before it went to the publisher.
No reply was ever made. See sources on file with author.
16. Construction of the last of the City's reservoirs, the Cannonsville, was
completed in 1964. Since then, the reputation of the DEP for world class engi-
neering has been based increasingly on historic laurels rather than on reality.
1997] 239
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deteriorated into a termite riddled stage facade where ap-
pointments were no longer based on international engineer-
ing reputation or merit, but on seemingly political favoritism.
Institutional dry rot at the DEP escalated dramatically in the late 1980s when
the last of the engineering giants - Edward Shaeder and Joseph Conway - both
retired from the DEP leaving behind all of the arrogance and secrecy and little
of the talent of the DEP's engineering glory days. At the same time, the most
talented of the DEP's laboratory scientists, such as Gerald Iwan, a man with a
national reputation, fled the DEP.
This Article deals principally with the DEP's Watershed police, inspectors
and protection engineers and does not discuss the DEP's laboratory, the Divi-
sion of Water Quality Control (DWQC). However, many of the same problems
that effect the three protection and enforcement units also afflict DWQC. These
problems began to surface in the late 1980s as the DEP managers began ag-
gressively sidelining good science in favor of political expediency. The loss of
Iwan and Collucio was a symptom of this sudden shift in emphasis. Iwan and
Collucio left the DEP in direct response to the City's giveaways of a critical
Watershed buffer zone.
In the past five years, the Division of Water Quality lab has succeeded in
driving away the last of the DEP's world class laboratory talent, Eva Chen and
Dr. Thomas Georgian. The stellar talent that distinguished the DEP as a world
class engineering and water quality science mecca during its heyday is now
gone. The DWQC has devolved into tiny fiefdoms, where individuals and super-
visors pursue pet projects and research papers with little sense of mission or
coordination other than to justify their jobs.
For example, DWQC recently spent several million dollars to create a re-
dundant Global Information Survey system for the DEP's West of Hudson office
in Ashokan when one already existed at the East of Hudson office in Valhalla.
The information system was the product of a DWQC employee, Elliot Schneid-
erman. Mr. Schneiderman, who has no education in either GIS or hydrology,
demanded the creation of a West of Hudson computer hydrology modeling pro-
gram. This was a huge undertaking requiring a large amount of data that does
not exist. Schneiderman hired four or five staffers to accomplish his project.
When it became apparent that Schneiderman's group could not get the job
done, he contracted it out, costing the DEP millions for a program of doubtful
utility.
Among the many other questionable projects that DWQC has recently em-
barked upon is deep well drilling and monitoring around the Kensico Reservoir
to search for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and bacteria. There could be no
reasonable expectation of finding those organisms or chemicals at depth in bed-
rock around that reservoir.
DWQC staff arranged to have these and other similar projects mandated by
suggesting them to the EPA to be included among the environmental require-
ments by which the City could qualify for filtration avoidance. The EPA then
required them apparently without considering their value. (The EPA admitted
to its complete lack of oversite procedures during the Kensico fence controversy.
The fence was also an EPA mandated deliverable recommended to the EPA by
the DEP's Sources Division).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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A bold sense of mission and confidence was displaced by turf
fights between warring feifdoms controlled by district engi-
neers who have routinely given away little chunks of the Wa-
tershed to developers, contractors, and political leaders to
gain favor and consolidate power. Furthermore, decision-
making became increasingly secretive, competent workers
were idled and incompetents promoted on what appeared to
be the basis of fidelity to their superiors. As a result, an un-
disciplined, highly politicized agency, once known for spectac-
ular engineering, is now plagued by the worst kind of crisis
management, inept reporting, poor science, cost overruns 1
7
and most surprisingly, poor engineering.' 8
17. One of the many examples is the new Croton Lake gate house which has
experienced a $50 million overrun and is experiencing severe operating difficul-
ties including defective valves and alarms, honeycombing concrete, poor quality
steel, and a leaking foundation. By way of explaining the latter, the New York
City Department of Investigation (DOI) has received credible allegations of con-
tracting corruption including millions of dollars of substandard rebar used in
construction.
18. The bidding process is questionable. A few recent examples:
1) In 1993, three bids were received by Sources Division for a maximum $1
million contract to find the source of high fecal coliform levels in a Kensico Res-
ervoir tributary, Malcolm Brook. The low bid, $600,000, was submitted by Wes-
ton Contracting whose "Regional Director", Joe McGough, was the former DEP
Commissioner. (The two other bids were for $1 million and $800,000). Wes-
ton's bid won the contract, but cost overruns to date on the contract exceed $1.3
million, and the source of the coliform was not found. The system thus creates
the risk that private contractors with friends within the DEP can win lucrative
contracts by submitting impossibly low bids and later count on their DEP allies
to make up the difference with discretionary cost overrun allocations.
The same contract called for TV inspection of sewer pipes in the Kensico
basin. The effort cost well over $100,000 in staff time and produced a study
that is utterly useless due to poor engineering design. See Roy F. WESTON OF
NEW YORK, INC., DRAFT TASK 4 SUMMARY REPORT HAZARDOUS SPILLS: KENSICO
RESERVOIR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL STUDY (April 11, 1994).
2) The 1995 Kensico Fence was installed in two frenzied weeks at a cost of
$850,000. See DEP memorandum from Thomas J. Hook, P.E. Acting Chief,
Sources Division to Richard Gainer, P.E., Acting Director of Water Supply and
Wastewater Collection (May 6, 1993). The effort cost the City an additional
$300,000 two weeks later when the fence was removed due to community objec-
tions and the DEP's inability to justify it on any scientific or rational basis. See
letter to Gelber from John Siciliano, Environmental Watchdog Association,
Westchester/Putnam/New York City.
3) The City's Kensico Reservoir waterfowl harassment program (designed
to reduce goose induced fecal levels in the Kensico) was successfully conducted
using the DEP Watershed inspectors at an estimated cost of $200,000-300,000
9
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The DEP's institutional culture is intensely antagonistic
toward a strong independent enforcement effort which might
interfere with relationships between district engineers, local
developers and political leaders. The DEP's role as an envi-
ronmental facilities manager and owner is in direct conflict
with the DEP's interest in strong Watershed enforcement.
The DEP's sewage treatment plants are among the worst pol-
luters in the Watershed. Police and inspectors currently re-
port to engineers who have strong interests in seeing that
these plants and other Watershed polluters are not prose-
cuted for environmental law violations.
As a result of this conflict, the DEP managers have made
certain that field enforcement is anemic. Prior to 1990, the
City's two enforcement units, the Watershed inspectors and
the Watershed police, were ordered by the DEP's water deliv-
ery engineers not to arrest or ticket polluters or otherwise
enforce the City's anti-pollution regulations. The City never
prosecuted any person or corporation for violating water pol-
lution regulations despite thousands of oil spills, septic sys-
tem failures and sewage treatment plant violations.
Although New York City had a staff of 510 lawyers in the
Corporation Counsel's office and another sixteen in the DEP,
not one City attorney had ever been assigned to prosecute
polluters. As a result, the City never tested its regulations or
the Public Health Law in court. The absolute vacuum of anti-
pollution enforcement prior to 1990 was so complete that Wa-
tershed polluters raised a laches defense when the City began
enforcing Watershed rules during the Dinkins Administra-
tion. In effect the polluters argued that by failing to enforce
its rules for half a century, New York City has forfeited its
right to regulate Watershed pollution. 19
annually. The program was recently contracted to an outside consultant for $1
million annually.
19. Crosby Hill subdivision was one of several Watershed developers to
raise this argument as a defense to an action by the DEP asserting authority
over a development proposal. The defense was also raised by Swan Deli and by
defendants in the Guillen tree cutting case.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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The EPA's Filtration Avoidance Determination 20 re-
quires the City to maintain an active "environmental enforce-
ment unit." Although the unit operated briefly and
successfully in 1993 and 1994, it has been quietly disbanded.
Its members have either left the DEP or were reassigned to
gate house security along with virtually all other police per-
sonnel. Only one officer is currently assigned to pollution pa-
trol in the entire 2000 square mile Watershed. 21
Meanwhile, the DEP's forty Watershed inspectors, once
the front line in the City's pollution enforcement program,
have been re-designated as Watershed maintainers (main-
tainers), a janitorial type classification, which precludes their
ever receiving peace officer status. The maintainers have no
power to issue tickets or order polluters to stop polluting.
The City's pollution prevention commitment is likewise
toothless. 22 The DEP managers, who tend to elevate civil or
structural engineering over water quality engineering, have
limited the hiring of qualified environmental protection engi-
neers critical to project review in the Watershed. The DEP
employs a tiny handful of multidisciplinary environmental
engineers who are fully qualified to perform complex project
review on the hundreds of proposed development projects in
the Watershed each year. These few qualified environmental
protection engineers are generally idled or diverted away
from the most sensitive and important development projects.
Despite the sincere attempts of successive City govern-
ments to root out this institutional culture, each succeeding
DEP Commissioner has faced the dilemma of an entrenched
system where lower level bureaucrats have the power to sab-
otage the water delivery system simply by turning the wrong
rusty valve. Since such an action could cripple the water sup-
ply and bring down the commissioner (as it nearly did Al Ap-
20. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NEW YORK CITY FILTRATION
AVOIDANCE DETERMINATION, Appendix LL to the Watershed Memorandum of
Agreement.
21. See sources on file with author.
22. By "pollution prevention" we mean the DEP's responsibility to review
projects proposed by Watershed developers to assure that they comply with reg-
ulations and will not result in damage to water quality.
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pleton when he attempted to reform the DEP's bureaucracy)
fear of the district and delivery engineers has been quietly,
but earnestly acknowledged as a serious obstacle to reform by
every DEP commissioner since Harvey Schultz. The threat
has caused each of them to approach reform with utmost
caution.
Despite the hope of other City officials and environmen-
talists that Marilyn Gelber, the first DEP Commissioner ap-
pointed by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, would be able to change
the institutional culture during her watch, two and a half
years passed without any action to restructure Sources Divi-
sion. When questioned by environmental groups, Gelber ex-
plained that she was "looking for the right person" whom she
could bring in to make the changes.
In 1994, she tentatively appointed Donald Shlenger, an
engineer who was formerly Vice President of the Hackensack
Water Company in New Jersey. However, Shlenger's ap-
pointment evaporated following public disclosures of his in-
volvement in the scandalous giveaway of New Jersey's
Pacsack Valley Watershed to a developer financially con-
nected to Shlenger's company.
A. A New Upstate Director
In March 1996, Commissioner Gelber hired New York
State Department of Health (DOH) Director of Environmen-
tal Health, Dr. William Stasiuk, as the DEP's Deputy Com-
missioner of the Bureau of Water Supply Quality and
Protection. Stasiuk was hired for the express purpose of
cleaning up "Sources Protection," the notoriously misnamed
upstate division that manages the City's 2000 square mile
Watershed. 23
23. Stasiuk told the author that Gelber "made me an offer I couldn't refuse."
Stasiuk was hired as a $107,000/year consultant. The City pays New York
State which forwards the money to Stasiuk, allowing him to retain his benefits
package from the DOH. Stasiuk would also be permitted to move the DEP's
upstate headquarters (at a cost to the City of $2 million) from Valhalla in the
Croton Watershed to Kingston which was closer to his home in Albany.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss1/8
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B. Stasiuk's Environmental Record
Environmental leaders in and out of government viewed
Stasiuk's appointment with trepidation. Over the years
these leaders came to view Stasiuk as the principle opponent
to strong Watershed protection within New York State gov-
ernment. During the Cuomo Administration, Stasiuk acted
as the champion for development interests gutting stricter
regulations proposed by the Dinkins and Giuliani Adminis-
trations. In 1994, Stasiuk removed the enforcement section
from the City's draft regulations, dramatically weakening im-
portant controls on septic systems and eliminated City au-
thority over road construction in the Watershed. At a
meeting convened by Governor Cuomo to debate Stasiuk's
proposed changes, Stasiuk astounded environmental and
public health leaders when he offered an explanation for his
actions by stating, "[tihere is no proof that construction of
roads contributes to reduced water quality."24 As a matter of
philosophy, Stasiuk firmly opposed any controls on water pol-
lution that were more stringent than existing DOH controls.
During subsequent negotiations with the EPA over the fed-
eral Filtration Avoidance Determination, Stasiuk was a mili-
tant and vocal proponent of the states' rights view that the
EPA should have no role in dictating water protection con-
trols to New York. Environmentalists were also aware that
Stasiuk carved out a special role for himself as a public apolo-
gist for the DEP's water quality managers, frequently speak-
ing to the press to gloss over the regular revelations about the
City's mismanagement of water resources. 25
24. Personal observations of the author.
25. For example, when vibrio cholera was found in the New York City water
supply in 1994, Stasiuk's unit publicly dismissed the finds as insignificant, glos-
sing over the disturbing fact that the cholera had survived the City's chlorina-
tion barriers and almost certainly entered the distribution system alive. See
Douglas Kennedy, Traces of Cholera Found in N.Y.'s Water Supply, N.Y. POST,
Sept. 9, 1994.
In January 1995, chemist Dr. Thomas Georgian, Operating Chief of the
City's Water Quality Laboratory, reported that the DEP's lab had been falsify-
ing samples to avoid public disclosure of water quality problems. See Alan
Finder, Former Chemist for the City Charges Manipulation of Drinking Water
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1995, at B3. The lab's respected director, Eva Chen,
1997] 245
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Environmentalists reacted negatively to the prospect of
Stasiuk's appointment as chief of upstate water supply pro-
tection because of Stasiuk's aggressively championed philoso-
phy against strong Watershed protection and his historic role
in closing ranks with department bureaucrats to divert public
scrutiny from DEP gaffs. However, the environmentalists
faced a Hobson's choice, any attempts to block Stasiuk's ap-
pointment would result in additional delays, perhaps even
years, in the reform of Sources Division's dysfunctional
bureaucracy.
Desperate to see order imposed on the disarray at the
Sources Division, environmentalists agreed to refrain from
publicly challenging Stasiuk's appointment. Environmental-
ists recognized that Stasiuk was a talented and bright man
with experience running a large state health bureaucracy.
Environmentalists believed Stasiuk had engineering profi-
ciency and close familiarity with the City's water supply
which would make him less reliant on the district engineers,
harder to intimidate and best able to manhandle a reform-
resistant bureaucracy. Environmentalists hoped he would
use his administrative talents to reorganize the Division, give
it a renewed sense of purpose and break down an institu-
resigned over similar charges. When Stasiuk 's agency was asked by the DEP
to review the charges and data, he pronounced them baseless and gave the lab a
clean bill of health. "In our view," Stasiuk told the New York Times, "the City's
monitoring program is outstanding." Don Van Natta, Jr., Albany Decides New
York City's Water Tests for Bacteria Were Thorough, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1995,
at B4.
In March 1995, when mercury was found in the Hillsview Reservoir in Yon-
kers caused by a bad batch of caustic soda, Stasiuk rubber stamped a report by
the DEP lab that erroneously attributed the mercury levels to a sampling error
caused by contaminated bottles. (Similar mercury hits in Yonkers, which uses
a different lab, show the metal was in the public water, not in the lab jars). See
sources on file with author.
Stasiuk also waived a $360,000 fine that the DEP was required to pay the
state for violations of turbidity standards at the Kensico Reservoir that resulted
when operators fell asleep and failed to respond to an alarm. Stasiuk's waiver
was conditioned on these monies being used for Croton monitoring, a condition
that the City has apparently never fulfilled.
In December 1995, a few months before his appointment, Stasiuk signed off
on the two year postponement of the Croton filtration order sparing Commis-
sioner Gelber the embarrassment of political fights with community groups op-
posed to siting proposals. See sources on file with author.
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tional culture that bedeviled the upstate water supply for
thirty years.
In pre-appointment meetings with Gelber and Stasiuk,
Stasiuk earnestly acknowledged to skeptical environmental
leaders his former role as an antagonist of Watershed protec-
tion. Stasiuk made the compelling case that he was capable of
adopting the mission of his new agency with as much enthu-
siasm as he did his perceived mission at the DOH. He prom-
ised to strengthen the DEP's enforcement mission.
C. An Early Report Card
While Stasiuk's impact on the DEP is still too early to
evaluate, his initial choices seem destined to perpetuate the
institutional culture rather than break it up. In June 1996,
Stasiuk announced that the Bureau would be divided into
three organizational units. The largest grouping is the Divi-
sion of Operations and Engineering Unit, now headed by
Deputy Director Thom Hook. Despite his twenty-six years at
the DEP, Hook has no background or education in sewage
treatment plant operations, no experience in project review
or SEQRA and a limited knowledge of upstate water supply
operations. Prior to his assignment in Valhalla, Hook was in
charge of the Hillview Reservoir in Yonkers and other intra-
city reservoirs. 26
Hook named Edwin Polese the chief of engineering oper-
ations, a position that entails responsibility for all engineer-
ing east and west of the Hudson. Polese has only been with
the DEP for three years. Polese spent those three years in a
Katonah office working primarily on failed septic systems,
during which time he often engaged in the dubious practice of
approving septic systems without field inspections. Polese
aggressively promotes his governing philosophy that the
DEP's mission is not to protect the water supply but simply to
enforce the rules and regulations. In the spring of 1995,
Polese proved himself incapable of testifying as an expert wit-
ness. He was removed as the Town of Cortlandt's expert in
26. See Letter from Elizabeth L. Hook, wife of Thorn J. Hook to Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr. (Sept. 22, 1997).
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Briarcliff Associates et al. v. Town of Cortandt,27 a case in-
volving the construction of a giant emory -mine in the New
York City Watershed. 28 After three months of intensive prep-
aration, Polese could neither articulate nor defend the City's
position. Three days before trial, Polese was replaced with
DEP engineer, Jim Roberts, whose testimony plaintiffs attor-
ney Michael Zarin commends without reservation 29 and cred-
its for having won the case.
Hook named Lynn Sadosky, deputy chief of engineering
for the east of Hudson, Croton district. Prior to her promo-
tion, which places three sections directly under her supervi-
sion, Sadosky was in charge of facility compliance and review.
Sadosky, who only recently became a licensed professional
engineer in New York,30 is well known for her hostility to-
ward environmental enforcement units. As head of the was-
tewater treatment plant inspections, she refused to share
incriminating data about reservoir polluters with the Water-
shed police. Recently, she authored and circulated a memo
suggesting that the City's enforcement priority should be ex-
posing environmental whistleblowers within the depart-
ment.31 Currently, Sadosky is in charge of the project review
and management personnel for the Croton district including
the sewer plant inspectors. She has no prior experience in
project review or sewer plant design.
Stasiuk's appointment of these three unqualified individ-
uals, Thom Hook, Lynn Sadosky, and Ed Polese, to high posi-
tions of responsibility, and his retention of Joe Boek and
Kevin Cloonan, two environmental law breakers32 openly
hostile toward environmental protection in the powerful posi-
27. See Briarliff Associates, Inc. v. Town of Cortandt, 534 N.Y.S.2d 215 (2d
Dep't 1988).
28. Phone conversation between author and Michael Zarin, Esq.
29. See infra note 49.
30. June 14, 1996.
31. See Memorandum from Lynn Sadosky, Employees Who Become Envi-
ronmental Liabilities, Spotting the Signs of a Problem Employee, Resolving the
Issues in the Workplace to the Supervisory Personnel, Engineering Section,
East of Hudson including Ed Polese, Thom Hook and Michael Collins (July 22,
1996) (on file with author).
32. See infra note 41.
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tion of district engineers, seems destined to perpetuate the
eye-winking cronyism and antagonism toward environmental
enforcement that plagues the DEP's institutional culture.
Under the new reorganization, the Watershed police re-
port to Stasiuk rather than the DEP commissioner, com-
pounding direct conflicts of interest described later in this
Article. This aspect of the proposed reorganization will only
maintain the status quo and hobble pollution prevention and
enforcement. 33 The failure to recognize and cure these con-
flicts in the current reorganization will condemn the DEP to a
weak enforcement role at the time when a strong enforce-
ment department is needed in the Watershed.
Additionally, an August 1, 1996 memorandum from
Stasiuk ordered the consolidation of the DEP's enforcement
activities into a single new "protection unit." Stasiuk's direc-
tive assigned all inspectors to the new unit headed by an en-
gineer, Todd West, a prot6g6 of district engineer, Joseph
Boek. 34 The DEP police do not have the authority or control
over this unit. According to Stasiuk, the unit's duties are to
establish "consistent inspection protocols" and a "uniform en-
forcement program." However, since the unit is composed
solely of engineers and inspectors, Stasiuk's new enforcement
unit has no more enforcement power than any other civilian
organization. The effect of the creation of this new unit is to
further isolate the police from the vital information and intel-
33. The DEP police have been called off of at least two investigations (at the
Cross River Dam and Danbury Pharmacol). Both investigations were subse-
quently turned over to engineering units. These instances are known to
Riverkeeper because our group had a role in reporting illegal conduct at these
sites. It is unknown whether other police investigations have also been turned
over to engineering units by Stasiuk.
34. See Memorandum from William Stasiuk, Deputy Commissioner, NYC
DEP Intra-department (Aug. 1, 1996) (on file with author). West has no en-
forcement experience and his inspectors have no enforcement authority. West's
administrative skills were called into question in a recent audit of the DEP
Watershed inspectors conducted by the New York City Comptroller's office in
which the sternest criticism is directed toward management of West's Catskill
Inspectors Unit. See Alan G. Hevesi, AUDIT REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WATERSHED PROTECTION PRO-
GRAM CATSKILL AND DELAWARE WATERSHED INSPECTORS at 5, June 27, 1996 (on
file with author) [hereinafter 1996 COMPTROLLER'S AUDIT].
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ligence gathering conducted by inspectors, district engineers,
and facilities' compliance units. This aspect -of the reorgani-
zation has all the signs of more shell game enforcement.
I. Water Delivery Engineers Versus Water Quality
Engineers
The DEP's dismal enforcement history within the Water-
shed flows principally from a single administrative error-
the failure to segregate the DEP's operational engineering
and facility management functions from its often antagonistic
enforcement and pollution prevention missions. The failure
to recognize and cure that error in the current reorganization
of the DEP will condemn the department to a weak enforce-
ment and pollution prevention role at the very moment that a
strong enforcement agency is needed in the Watershed. The
DEP's Watershed police, Watershed inspectors and its hand-
ful of qualified environmental protection engineers have his-
torically reported to the DEP facility managers/operations
engineers whose expertise is water delivery and have been, at
best, indifferent toward environmental protection or
enforcement.
The institutional culture at the DEP consists of a collec-
tion of bureaucratic fiefdoms that evolved as the district engi-
neers and their management allies consolidated power and
gained political favor by giving away small chunks of the Wa-
tershed to benefit influential local developers and landown-
ers. 35 Sewer and septic violations, incursions onto reservoir
buffer zones and other insults to water quality have been rou-
tinely ignored or winked at in the name of "good community
relations." Managing engineers commonly overrule enforcers
by granting extensions on compliance or waiving penalties,
often granting second, third and fourth chances to repeat
polluters.
35. Not only has DEP permitted land giveaways like allowing Pepsi Co. to
encroach upon the reservoir buffer zone with its headquarters and permitting
Putnam County Hospital an easement to cross buffer lands in order to dis-
charge medical wastes into the Croton Falls reservoir, but it has also compro-
mised water quality as well as its own authority by refusing to strictly enforce
the Watershed regulations.
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The last thing these engineers want is an independent
enforcement body or environmental experts looking over
their shoulders and interfering in cozy relationships with lo-
cal political powers. To avoid this eventuality, they have
maintained a tight choke hold on the DEP's pollution preven-
tion and enforcement staffs and have taken responsibility for
working out amicable settlements with environmental law
breakers themselves.36 Ordered not to do their jobs, demoral-
ized inspectors, police and Watershed protection engineers
have been reduced to performing errand services for the facil-
ities/operations engineers.37
This Article is not intended to fault the DEP's opera-
tional engineers, but to highlight the organizational flaw that
gave facilities/operational engineers jurisdiction over Water-
shed enforcement and pollution-prevention and overrule the
determinations of environmentally qualified engineers. New
York City has a proud engineering history. The individuals
who designed the New York City reservoir and aqueduct sys-
tem were the most talented and innovative civil engineers of
their time. They devised and constructed a water delivery
system that instantly became the envy of the world. How-
ever, the skills that made them visionary engineers were not
skills that would make them great enforcers. This was a re-
sponsibility for which they had neither training nor profes-
sional inclination.
A. Conflict of Interest 38
A primary conflict of interest is inherent in the dual mis-
sion of the agency. The DEP is a regulatory agency and an
environmental facility manager.39 These roles create a made-
to-order conflict of interest that is one of the principle causes
36. See sources on file with author.
37. See sources on file with author.
38. As it is used in this Article, the phrase "conflict of interest" is not
intended to imply a traditional financial or fiduciary conflict. The term conveys
an inherent conflict of institutional objectives that can only be remedied by
structural changes within the department to separate environmental
enforcement from facilities maintenance and management.
39. See NEW YORK CiTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE AND CHARTER ch. 57, § 1403.
The Charter provides a mission statement for the DEP:
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of the DEP's disastrous environmental record. In its role as
environmental facilities manager, the DEP is one of the larg-
est polluters in the Watershed. Seven of the 112 sewer plants
that discharge into New York City's reservoir system are
owned by New York City. The DEP's engineers (under an-
cient agreements with local communities) who operate the
Watershed have historically been among the worst Water-
shed polluters. 40 These include the Tannersville, Mahopac
and Margaretville plants, which continue to violate their per-
mits. Inadequate enforcement against the City-owned plants
should not come as a surprise, since the City's enforcement
staff reports to the same engineers who are responsible for
permit compliance at those plants. This conflict of interest
must be eliminated if the City is to maintain an effective Wa-
tershed enforcement presence. 41
The powers and duties of the commissioner shall include, without
limitation, the following:
A. Water resources control.
(1) The commissioner shall have charge and control of:
(a) All structures and property connected with the supply and
distribution of water for public use not owned by private corpora-
tions, including all fire and drinking hydrants and all water meters;
(b) Furnishing the water supply and maintaining its quality,
and of the investigation for and the construction of all works neces-
sary to deliver the proper and required quality of water with ample
reserve for contingencies and future demands; and
(c) Making and enforcing rules and regulations governing and
restricting the use and supply of water.
Id.
40. The City-owned plant at Tannersville had 2800 violations in a five year
period.
41. The district engineers are among the Watershed's most notorious envi-
ronmental lawbreakers. Their record of illegal conduct is not simply a matter of
involuntary discharge exceedances. In 1994, Delaware District System Engi-
neer Kevin Cloonan ordered the illegal dumping of at least 100,000 gallons of
raw sewage into a woodland near the Margaretville sewer plant on lands drain-
ing into the Pepacton Reservoir. The DEP paid a $10,000 penalty to New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for the crime. The
DEC officers also caught Cloonan illegally storing drums of PCB oil in the lower
level of the Rondout chamber. In a separate incident, the DEC officers found
drums containing hazardous waste illegally buried by Cloonan on New York
City water supply lands. The same year the DEC officers caught Catskill Dis-
trict Engineer Joe Boek illegally storing leaking transformers suspected of
housing PCB oil in a shaft building of the Catskill aqueduct where the oil could
drain directly to drinking water.
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The upstate Watershed communities are extremely re-
sentful that the City is the worst polluter in the system. Lo-
cal towns with non-complying sewage treatment plants or
other environmental problems have not hesitated to address
this dichotomy with the City and state officials when their
own violations have attracted enforcement attention. The
existence of this conflict is often cited as one of the principle
reasons that New York City abdicated its enforcement au-
thority in the Watershed prior to 1989. The conflict of inter-
est raised by continuing violations at these plants hinders a
strict enforcement in the Watershed by state and City
agencies.
B. Water Supply Over Water Quality
Furthermore, the DEP's operational engineers have lim-
ited or no training in ecology. Historically, career advance-
ment and professional recognition among the DEP's water
delivery engineers was unlikely to result from ecological solu-
tions. Throughout Watershed history, the engineers and fa-
cility managers have persistently exalted the issue of water
delivery or water supply over water quality. Catskill district
engineer, Joseph Boek, expressed this governing priority in a
June 1994 memo to Sources Division's Deputy Director, War-
ren Neuberger. After drawing the distinction between water
supply and water quality, Boek proclaimed:
Water supply concerns can be the only ones that drive us
.... The credibility of the DEP in the [Wiatershed, which
is essential because we work closely with local govern-
ments, hinges on water supply issues as our only concern.
(emphasis in original).42
For many years, under leadership of the Watershed man-
agers, the DEP almost completely abdicated its statutory au-
thority to protect water quality, opting instead for
42. See Internal DEP Memorandum from Joseph M. Boek, P.E., Catskill
District Engineer, to Warren J. Neuberger, Deputy Director, Sources Division
(June 7, 1994), at 3 (on file with author) [hereinafter Boek Memo]. Boek opens
his memo with the bold assertion that "Sewage discharges do not threaten the
water quality in the Catskill District." (emphasis in original).
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construction and chemical solutions to solve the reservoirs'
increasingly serious pollution problems. For example, before
the practice was declared unlawful by a federal court in
1990,4 3 the City's engineers periodically dosed upstate reser-
voirs with thousands of tons of toxic algacides and pesticides
to control development-related pollution. The practice de-
stroyed the natural assimilative capacity of the West Branch
Reservoir and caused massive fish kills in the Cannonsville,
Rondout and Kensico Reservoirs. The dosages were not only
illegal, but any ecological expert would recognize the negative
water quality impacts. Despite warnings from one DEP engi-
neer,4 the DEP refused to recognize the critical filtering ca-
pacity of natural systems and merely viewed the West
Branch Reservoir as a holding tank for water and chemicals.
Rather than controlling careless development in the Water-
shed, the facilities/operational engineers and their proteges
trusted civil engineering ingenuity to cure the pollution
caused by uncontrolled growth.45
C. A Bias Toward Filtration
Many of the DEP's facilities/operational and district en-
gineers continue to assert that the City should filter its drink-
ing water supply-a contingency that has the potential to be
extremely lucrative to any operational engineer working in
the City water supply. It is an openly discussed eventuality
among the DEP's facilities/operational engineers that a filtra-
tion order will provide an opportunity to take the City buy-
out and accept generous consulting arrangements with engi-
neering firms contracted to construct the plant. This is an-
43. See Hudson River Fisherman's Assn. v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp.
1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
44. As early as 1985, environmental protection engineer Jim Roberts was
warning the DEP managers of the dangers of regular pesticide/algacides dos-
ings. Roberts was progressively ostracized for his ecology-based efforts.
45. The $850,000 dollar fence erected by the DEP engineers in the Spring of
1995 and torn down a few weeks later, is another example where the obsession
to build something displaced good common-sense Watershed management;
Kensico's problems, according to the DEP's own studies, is not illegal dumping
of trash but defective septic systems and poison run-off from the airport and
other local users.
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other conflict that might compromise the inclination of
certain engineers toward aggressive enforcement.
46
D. The DEP's Pollution Prevention Engineers: An
Enforcement Resource Ignored
The first line of enforcement is project review, the stage
at which regulations are applied to achieve pollution preven-
tion. The DEP has the authority and duty to review Water-
shed development proposals for compliance with the
regulations and with the broad objective of water quality pro-
tection.47 This important mission has been systematically
sabotaged by the DEP facilities engineers who feel
threatened by the DEP's new water quality mission.
There is an important distinction between the DEP's fa-
cilities/operational engineers and its qualified Watershed
protection engineers. The former category consists of struc-
tural, mechanical, civil, hydraulic and so-called environmen-
tal (actually sewage treatment plant) engineers. This is the
class of engineers that designs and builds the system and has
expertise in water delivery. Although the last of the reservoir
46. Former Commissioner Albert Appleton, as well as others, have specu-
lated that two incidents of high turbidity in the Kensico in 1992 were created by
a certain District Engineer who inexplicably released dangerously turbid Asho-
kan Reservoir waters precisely timed to coincide with testing associated with
the EPA's filtration avoidance assessment. Appleton believed that one more hit
during that period would have automatically triggered filtration under the
EPA's Surface Water Treatment Rule. See Surface Water Treatment Rule
(SWTR), 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.71-.75 (1996); personal communication by Al Apple-
ton with author (Feb. 1995).
47. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 1100-1105 (McKinney 1996). Section
1100 of the Public Health Law authorizes the New York State Department of
Health (DOH) to issue rules and regulations to protect the drinking water sup-
ply of New York City and other municipalities and requires that the DOH ap-
prove any rules and regulations promulgated by the City of New York
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for this purpose. The unique
authority of the DEP to promulgate rules and regulations which affect land use
within the watershed, comes from Chapter 723 of the Laws of 1905, which were
enacted in response to the turn of the century water shortage in New York City.
That crisis precipitated the construction of the Catskill system. See Act of June
1905, Ch. 723 1905 N.Y.LAws 2022; see also Rules of the City of New York,
Rules and Regulations For the Protection From Contamination, Degradation
and Pollution of The New York City Water Supply and Its Sources, Ch.18
(1997).
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and aqueduct engineering giants who built the system retired
from the DEP in approximately 1989, their heirs continue to
rule the department and jealously impede its transition to a
new mission that emphasizes water purity.
The latter category (Watershed protection engineers) are
engineering positions that require unique training for Water-
shed protection. The training includes civil, environmental
or agricultural engineering combined with backgrounds in
hydrology, limnology, biology, ecology, organic chemistry, soil
mechanics, and advanced work in areas such as open channel
flow and groundwater hydrology, hydraulic structures and
sediment transport. These engineers evaluate development
proposals within the Watershed, assessing and designing
remediation to address water quality insults. They also serve
an enforcement role, investigating polluters using forensic
engineering and providing expert testimony. Traditionally,
this category of engineers has shared pariah status within
the DEP with the Watershed police and inspectors.
The DEP's handful of qualified Watershed protection en-
gineers has fought the DEP managers and upstate developers
over the years to implement strong Watershed protection re-
quirements. Their efforts threatened the relationship be-
tween upstate developers and the DEP managers. The
managers were reluctant to hire or share power with environ-
mental protection engineers. In 1985, the department had
only one qualified Watershed protection engineer.
Since then, the EPA's Filtration Avoidance Determina-
tion and other Watershed protection initiatives have man-
dated that the DEP occupy pollution prevention positions
with qualified Watershed protection engineers. Many of the
DEP managers filled these positions with unqualified person-
nel. Additionally, the new certified professional engineers
(P.E.) do not have experience in water resources or Water-
shed protection. Most of the qualified environmental protec-
tion engineers who were hired in the past have left the
department as a result of their treatment, the lack of oppor-
tunity and lack of agency commitment to water purity. At
this time, only a few qualified environmental engineers (with
multidisciplinary backgrounds or adequate sewage treatment
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plant education and experience) are employed by the DEP
and describe themselves as thoroughly demoralized. Their
jobs entail reviewing hundreds of Watershed development
proposals. Their determinations on water quality issues are
frequently overridden by less qualified operational engineers
or non-engineers. They are frequently removed from project
reviews when their determinations offend politically powerful
developers. 48 Managing personnel deliberately keep these
qualified engineers away from meaningful Watershed protec-
tion assignments. For example, Jim Roberts, the City's most
experienced protection engineer has not been given an as-
signment since November 1995. On that date, he was de-
moted from his position as a DEP supervisor without notice
or explanation. 49
The unwillingness to hire or delegate important assign-
ments to qualified environmental protection engineers is re-
sulting in substandard engineering work as well as lost staff
48. For example, in 1994, Sources Division Chief Joe Landau removed Jim
Roberts, P.E., then a supervisor, from project review of Campus at Fields Cor-
ner, the largest project in the Watershed. Campus was sponsored by a devel-
oper with powerful political connections. To fill Roberts' spot, Landau
appointed Jim Benson, a non-engineer, to perform the non-point source pollu-
tion analysis for phosphorous loadings and to comment on other technical is-
sues, jobs for which Benson was not qualified. Telephone interview conducted
by author.
49. Certain local developers and Sources Division engineers had for many
years conducted a vigorous campaign to have Roberts removed from his position
of authority within the DEP due principally to his effectiveness as an advocate
for Watershed protection. Roberts' effectiveness is attested to by Michael Zarin.
Zarin, an attorney for Sive Paget & Riesel, is among the state's foremost envi-
ronmental lawyers and has an extensive practice representing New York City
Watershed developers and citizen groups. Zarin has fought both with and
against Roberts acting in the roles of both engineer and expert witness. In
1995, Zarin represented the Town of Cortlandt in a case against a proposed
emory mine. Zarin turned to Roberts as an expert witness when, after three
months of preparation, another City engineer, Ed Polese, was unable to defend
the City's position. According to Zarin, "Roberts was fantastic. With only a
couple days of preparation, he gave compelling and passionate testimony on the
negative impacts of flour dust, groundwater recharge, non-point source sedi-
ment transport and the inadequacy of the proposed retention lagoons. He was
great. He is an asset to the City in the cause of Watershed protection." Tele-
phone Interview with Michael Zarin (Winter 1996). Zarin, incidentally, was
also the attorney for Campus at Fields Corner, a development which Roberts
passionately and effectively opposed. See supra note 48.
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time, money and opportunities. In 1996, for example, the
DEP's non-engineer supervisor, Jim Benson,50 commissioned
TV inspections of sewers in the Kensico Watershed without
first consulting in-house sewer experts on the protocols for
the study. The City spent over $100,000 in staff time on the
study. After consulting environmental protection engineer
Paul Aksoz in March of this year, the DEP realized that the
entire study was ineffective. If the DEP had consulted Aksoz
earlier, it would have saved money and lost staff time.
Another example: the sixty-day travel time engineering
study51 mandated by the DOH was diverted from the protec-
tion engineers to Deputy Director, Mike Principe, Division of
Water Quality Control, where results and data were inacces-
sible to protection engineers. The report 52 was written by
Principe's staffer Lorraine Janus, who is unqualified for that
work. If that study had been correctly conducted by qualified
engineers, it might have resulted in a greater portion of the
Watershed being protected.5 3
The DEP management's refusal to share responsibility or
information with its qualified Watershed protection engi-
neers is forcing the City to spend millions of dollars con-
50. See Amy Witko, Benson's Town Board Appointment Now Official, THE
PAWLING NEWS CHRONICLE, Nov. 22, 1995, at Al.
51. A sixty-day travel time zone is the area from which it takes sixty-days
or less for water to travel to intake points for distribution to New York City,
which is also the point of disinfection. Cryptospordium and other dangerous
pathogens are expected to die off within that time. Therefore, areas of the Wa-
tershed within the sixty-day travel time area are prioritized for land acquisition
under the Watershed Agreement. See NYC Watershed Memorandum of Agree-
ment, supra note 1.
52. Source on file with author.
53. There are many other examples: the DEP's Pathogen Study Group does
not include a single qualified engineer. (Though in 1992, an engineer was as-
signed to the group, he was never notified of a single meeting). As a result, the
group was unaware of critical physical relationships including increased resist-
ance of pathogens to disinfectants such as ultraviolet light and chlorine.
Another example, the DEP's critically important phosphorous Total Maxi-
mum Discharge Level study should have been performed by both scientists and
qualified environmental protection engineers. Instead, the engineering portion
was given to a non-engineer, Jim Benson to comment on. The most experienced
engineers were not allowed to see it. The outcome was a study that failed to
perform engineering analyses correctly. The result may be seriously detrimen-
tal to reservoir water quality.
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tracting out tasks that could be more efficiently performed by
in-house talent. For example, Dale Borchert, a non-engineer,
was given the job of developing technical formulations for
monitoring the effectiveness of non-point source pollution
best management practices (BMPs). He was incapable of
completing this, so a contract was put out to Cornell Univer-
sity. A qualified engineer has not seen the work.54
Due to the result of the systematic ostracization of envi-
ronmental protection engineers within the department, the
DEP's capacity to protect water quality is neither asked nor
answered by management. In 1994, environmental protec-
tion engineer, Paul Aksoz, presented the DEP management
with a list of technical analyses that must be required by the
DEP when reviewing major projects involving treated waste-
water that discharges into the ground. The Aksoz memoran-
dum shows that none of the critical analyses have been
performed and no one in the DEP (with a few exceptions) has
the ability to complete the work. To date, Askoz has not re-
ceived a response from the DEP management regarding this
memo.
Power and access to information and resources are so
tightly guarded by the Division of Water Quality Control and
Management that water protection engineers are presently
not allowed to take water samples for testing-a situation
that has resulted in the DEP's inability to bring Clean Water
54. There are many examples: James Benson, a non-engineering Project
Manager, is currently contracting for an engineering firm, Hazen & Sawyer, to
design stormwater detention basins for Malcolm Brook and another engineer-
ing firm to design stormwater best management practices for the Kensico Wa-
tershed. Benson is neither trained to design nor to evaluate the contracted
designs for appropriateness or correctness. However, the DEP has several in-
house Watershed protection engineers capable of doing both design and evalua-
tion work.
Another example, Angela Cataldi, P.E., who is supervisor in Project Re-
view, working under Ed Polese, is putting out a contract to bid to survey septic
systems for the EPA required Septic System Siting Study. The surveying to be
done is minor and simple. It does not require a licensed surveyor and could be
performed by any civil engineer freshman and by any of the under-occupied
environmental engineers now employed by the DEP. Sources on file with
author.
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Act cases.5 5 In another recent case, a water protection engi-
neer telephoned for a Watershed inspector to take samples
and was forced to ask a favor to encourage the lab to run the
sample. Since it took the inspector one hour to get to the site,
the time of peak contamination had passed and the DEP's
case against the polluter was thereby weakened.
During the 1996 Watershed negotiations, Riverkeeper
representatives witnessed firsthand the lack of technical ex-
pertise that afflicts the agency because of ostracization of
qualified environmental protection engineers. During a pro-
tracted debate on subsurface disposal systems that took place
over several weeks, the DEP attorneys faced a battery of no
less than five pro-development engineers from the Ulster,
Putnam, and Westchester County Health Departments, and
the State Departments of Health and Environmental Conser-
vation. Confronting the City's opposition to the use of com-
mercial galley septic systems,56 these engineers were
antagonistic to controls on commercial development and
made statements that contradicted well-established laws of
physics. The City attorneys could not rebut even the most
absurd assertions because the City would not produce a sin-
gle competent engineer to defend its position in this highly
technical debate. 57 The DEP relied, instead, on a manage-
ment official who is not an engineer.58 Although this official
did his best to defend the City's position, environmentalists
watched aghast as, unable to cite published technical litera-
ture or to defend the most basic rationale in support of the
City's proposed regulations, he withered before the snicker-
ing, eye rolling contempt of the professional engineers.59
This failure clearly resulted in weaker septic regulations that
are now part of the final Watershed rules.
55. For this reason, the DEP had to abandon potential sediment discharge
cases against the construction site at Horsepound Ridge in the Town of Kent
and Crosby Subdivision in the Town of Southeast.
56. Large subsurface septic systems used by mall, cineplex and corporate
park developers which disperse, but don't treat sewage.
57. Personal observations of the author.
58. Personal observations of the author made during the course of the nego-
tiations regarding the Watershed Memorandum of Agreement.
59. See id.
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At another meeting, this same official's ineptitude was so
obvious that City attorneys could be seen kicking him under
the table to silence him. The irony is that Jim Roberts, a
highly competent environmental engineer with a proven
track record as a first-class expert witness was left out of the
negotiating process where he could have invaluably assisted
the City's position.60 There can be no explanation for Rob-
erts' exile other than the jealousy of the managing engineers.
The DEP's upstate management regularly overrides en-
vironmental protection engineers and removes them from
projects when their scientific judgment causes inconvenience
to powerful developers. In retaliation for strict controls Rob-
erts routinely imposes on Watershed development projects,
he has been permanently removed from all project review de-
spite the fact that he has repeatedly confirmed his status as
the DEP's most effective witness in court cases against pol-
luters and developers. 61 At the same time, the DEP's manag-
60. Personal observations of the author. The DEP manager who argued the
City's position opposing the use of galley systems frequently cited a DEP report
on galleys as the source of his opinions and data. Ironically, the author of this
report, a superb piece of research, was Jim Roberts. Unfortunately, the DEP
official lacked the confidence and depth to effectively defend its conclusions.
61. In addition to having been permanently removed from all Westchester
and Putnam County cases, Roberts was regularly removed from individual
cases where his determination displeased powerful developers. In each case,
the DEP managers assigned more complacent personnel to review and approve
the project. In many of these cases, Roberts' views were later vindicated when
the developers caused severe environmental injury to the reservoirs.
In 1985, for example, the DEP inspectors and Jim Roberts were ordered to
"stay away" from IBM's massive construction erosion project in Somers which
Roberts had criticized. That project caused catastrophic erosion into the Mus-
coot Reservoir.
* Brandywyne Development In 1992, a construction firm proposed develop-
ment on seventeen lots characterized by steep slopes, hydric soils, rocky
soils and depth to bedrock. Roberts, originally approved ten of the seven-
teen sites in June 1994. Sources Division management, however, removed
Roberts from the project and assigned Ed Polese in November 1994. Polese
reversed Roberts' decision and approved an additional five lots.
* Benetar Development Roberts disapproved a subdivision in the Town of
Southeast. The project was given to another DEP engineer and approved.
The developer moved a stream and constructed a defective septic system
causing heavy turbidity from the site into the Middle Branch Reservoir.
* MLR Residential Subdivision A Lewisboro developer proposed a thirty unit
residential subdivision on wetland and sandy soil, which Roberts found to be
29
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ers, together with a handful of local developers, have
successfully branded Roberts as "difficult" or a "problem em-
ployee." 62 Roberts' record is not consistent with this assess-
ment.63  Roberts is an intelligent and competent
environmental engineer who is meticulous, popular with com-
munity groups, the public, environmentalists and many town
unsuitable for septic systems. Roberts was yanked from the project and re-
placed by Margaret Lloyd, who subsequently approved the project. Lloyd is
not a professional engineer and is not an expert in analyzing soils for septic
systems. Most of the lots were ultimately approved, including several whose
septic systems will be located in inappropriate soils, and which will almost
certainly fail.
" Clearpool Camp is a large overnight camp near the Boyds Corner Reservoir,
reopened by New York City Schools Department in 1992 after several years
of disuse. The DEP's experts, including Jim Roberts and Pat O'Hara,
thought that the camp's vintage sewage treatment technology was unsafe
for health reasons. When they asked the camp to upgrade to tertiary treat-
ment, Sources Division management removed them from the project and as-
signed a new project engineer who approved the project without the
upgrade.
" Ice Rink, Town of Southeast This may be the best example of how political
considerations often displace good science and engineering in the Water-
shed. A commercial septic system was proposed by the developer to serve its
proposed public ice rink. Investigation of the site revealed high ground-
water levels, 24"-0" from the surface. A steep, thirty foot deep, excavation
for the skating rink was to be dug less than 100 feet from the proposed sep-
tic system. Mr. Roberts and his staff concluded that partially treated orga-
nisms would be discharged to surface waters at the steep cut which would
intercept the water table. The effluent from the septic system would end up
in the Middle Branch Reservoir about 1,500 feet from a public water supply
intake. When other configurations were considered, they generated new
sets of problems.
County Supervisor Bondi and elected officials of the Town of Southeast pe-
titioned the DOH and Commissioner Gelber to have the septic system ap-
proved. Though the authority for the system lay with the DEC, the DOH took
the lead and suggested a design they said would work. The DOH engineers had
never seen the site. Their "solution" ignored basic groundwater hydrology. The
project was taken out of Roberts' hands and was handled by Joe Landau, Ted
Simroe, and Dick Gainer, P.E., none of whom were qualified for the work. See
DEP Intra-department Memorandum from Paul Aksoz, PhD., PE to Robert Le-
mieux, First Deputy Commissioner & Acting Director (Jun. 15, 1995). At a
meeting in Valhalla on the project, Putnam County Executive Bondi told the
DEP officials that, "[s]ometimes public relations outweigh other considera-
tions." Following a secret meeting, the agency approved a slightly altered con-
figuration that suffered the same environmental deficiencies. Fortunately, the
delay caused the project owner to find another more appropriate location.
62. Personal interview conducted by author.
63. See supra note 49.
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officials. He consistently wins court cases and hearings as an
expert witness defending the scientific bases of the require-
ments he imposes on developers.
The DEP's policy of systematically removing its most
qualified engineers from the decision-making process on im-
portant projects has meant that the DEP personnel rarely at-
tend local planning meetings. Regular attendance at
planning board meetings on Watershed projects is essential
for the DEP to present important information and counter
misinformation presented by developers and their experts.
This participation is welcomed by community groups and
towns looking for hard scientific data to bolster their argu-
ments against destructive development. Developers and
their consultants and attorneys routinely attend these meet-
ings with an army of experts who are fully prepared to argue
the developers' position. In the DEP's absence, developers'
versions of science and events often stand unchallenged.
II. Watershed Enforcement: Toothless Enforcers
A. Why Strong Enforcement is Necessary
Watershed laws are intended to protect public health,
safety and welfare, by ensuring high water quality, enhanc-
ing ecosystem health and reducing pollution by internalizing
pollution costs into a discharger's activities. However,
merely enacting the regulations will not accomplish any of
these objectives alone; only widespread compliance with the
law will achieve these goals.
Polluters have no incentive to comply with environmen-
tal laws since noncompliance results in economic benefits (the
free use of water for waste disposal) while compliance exacts
a financial cost. Unchecked by aggressive enforcement, these
pressures will systematically undermine any system of envi-
ronmental law. James Elder, the former director of the EPA
Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, observed that "[wie
have found repeatedly that nothing is self-sustaining in the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
program. If a state's vigilance or the EPA's regional vigilance
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subsides, their noncompliance and point source contribution
[of pollution] increase."64
Compliance is essential to the success of any environ-
mental regulatory program because it is the only way that
society will enjoy the benefits envisioned by environmental
laws, regulations, standards and permits that legislatures
have devised to protect the public. "The vast regulatory ap-
paratus we have put in place to protect public health and the
environment amounts to mere empty words without compli-
ance."6 5 Widespread compliance with environmental law
only occurs where society enjoys the deterrent value of strict,
sure enforcement.
According to Professor David Hodas:
To achieve compliance, an effective enforcement system
must exist. Enforcement is the use of legal tools, formal
and informal, to compel compliance by imposing legal sanc-
tions or penalties. Effective enforcement is based on the
theory of deterrence, which holds that a strong enforce-
ment program deters that regulated community from vio-
lating in the first place, deters specific violators from
further violations and deters the public from violating
other laws. Effective enforcement accomplishes these
goals by providing visible examples to encourage others in
the regulated population to maintain desired behavior to
avoid a similar fate .... [I]t is generally accepted that ef-
fective deterrence requires four elements: (1) significant
likelihood that a violation will be detected; (2) swift and
sure enforcement response; (3) appropriately severe sanc-
tions; and (4) that each of these factors will be perceived as
real.6 6
64. James R. Elder et al., Regulation of Water Quality, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
10,029-37 (Jan. 1992).
65. CHERYL WASSERMAN, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 21, 22 (T.H. Tietenberg ed., 1992).
66. David R. Hodas, Environmental Federalism: Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can There Not Be a Crowd When
Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United States, The States and their Citi-
zens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1603 (1995).
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Unfortunately, none of these factors is present in the enforce-
ment regimen which currently governs the New York City
water supply.
In defending their enforcement practices, the DEP man-
agers argue that tough policies would injure the DEP's genial
relationships with Watershed communities. 67 However, re-
cent experience has demonstrated strong community support
for strict enforcement of the City's Watershed regulations.68
This is not to say that there may be some important political
or social rationale that calls for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion or some broader change in emphasis in the DEP's
enforcement priorities. However, these decisions should be
carefully considered and deliberately made by accountable
public officials and not on a case-by-case basis by deputy com-
missioners or other lower level bureaucrats.
A better way to maintain good community relations is by
utilizing careful screening and recruitment practices in hir-
ing enforcement staffs, cultivating strong leadership capable
of instilling high morale that one finds in a disciplined and
professional police force and by aggressively outreaching to
the communty that involves the Watershed public in Water-
shed protection and enforcement. Additionally, the DEP can
demonstrate sensitivity and build strong community ties
while maintaining strict enforcement policies by affording
preference to Watershed residents in hiring enforcement per-
sonnel. While the DEP should always remain sensitive to the
feelings and traditions of local Watershed communities, it
should not use "sensitivity" as an excuse to compromise its
broad enforcement mission.
67. See, e.g., Joel A. Miele Sr., DEP Vigorously Protecting Its Reservoirs,
REPORTER DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1997.
68. In response to perceived public demand for tough Watershed enforce-
ment, the Westchester County District Attorney has initiated a special environ-
mental enforcement unit and is aggressively seeking Watershed cases from the
DEP. The Putnam County D.A. has been even more aggressive than Westches-
ter at prosecuting pollution violations in the New York City Watershed. DEP
has repeatedly received glowing editorial support and laudatory stories in Wa-
tershed community newspapers, following pollution arrests by the DEP police.
See infra note 86.
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B. Professional Bias Against Enforcement
There are more subtle, but equally pervasive conflicts
that make facilities/operational engineers poor enforcement
officials. Facilities/operational engineers, by nature and
training, are inclined toward problem solving rather than
tough enforcement. Problem solving is best achieved through
open communications with facility operators and developers'
engineers. When engineers are charged with enforcing envi-
ronmental laws, compliance strategy tends to be concilia-
tory.69 Engineers within the DEP are often more concerned
with bringing the specific violator into compliance with the
law than with punishing violators or deterring future viola-
tions with civil penalties and other sanctions. They are
averse to adjudication, preferring ongoing working relation-
ships with violators over adversarial actions. They favor pri-
vate negotiations with polluters that often result in long
delays in compliance. Private negotiations minimize tensions
with the regulated community by accommodating their eco-
nomic and political interests. The Catskill district engineer,
Joe Boek, described this approach in a June 7, 1994 memo to
Sources Division Deputy Director, Warren Neuberger:
[Ilt is more important to work with communities and indi-
viduals to solve problems than to fight. This is exactly how
the districts have operated for years .... Barring an envi-
ronmental disaster or intentional gross violation of our
regulations, we prefer to speak with a violator and obtain
quick mitigation voluntarily.
Boek advocates an enforcement policy where the DEP would
avoid taking "the lead role, but rather to use the offices of the
DEC and state and county health departments to achieve the
same end."70
Such an approach may seem like good engineering policy
by a facility manager. However, it is disastrous from an en-
forcement standpoint. The impacts of these policies are com-
pounded in the New York City Watershed by a similar hands-
69. See Hodas, supra note 66 and accompanying text.
70. See Boek Memo, supra note 42, at 2.
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off attitude prevalent among the state's enforcement agen-
cies. Enforcement agencies have been largely absent from
the field of Watershed enforcement and point to the DEP as
the agency with primary responsibility for Watershed protec-
tion. Nevertheless, the DEP management engineers still look
to the DEC and DOH as the primary enforcement organs and
are more likely to report serious Watershed crimes to the
DEC than to their own Watershed police.
C. Another Conflict of Interest
Enforcement's low priority among the DEP's facilities/op-
erational engineers is more deeply rooted than a mere philo-
sophical inclination toward leniency. When a developer or a
town constructs a polluting facility in the Watershed, recom-
mendations made by the DEP engineers are often integrated
into the project design. DEP engineering approval is re-
quired for many projects. Problems arise when these projects
fail to perform as anticipated. 71 There is no merit in arguing
that the approving engineer can step into the shoes of the en-
forcement official and direct strict enforcement and prosecu-
tion of the violator, when that same engineer plays a critical
role in designing the project to be approved.
An example of this conflict occurred in July 1996 when a
DEP police officer, in response to a public complaint, at-
tempted to issue a summons to Yonkers Contracting, a con-
struction firm engaged in reconstruction of the Cross River
Dam. The company's inadequate erosion control measures
management practices (its BMPs) had resulted in discharges
of thousands of tons of turbid sediment into the Muscoot Inlet
over several weeks. The police officer was ordered by superi-
ors at DEP not to issue the ticket. When the author of this
Article questioned Deputy Commissioner Stasiuk about the
order (during a meeting with Commissioner Gelber), Stasiuk
explained the decision: "We [the DEP] designed the BMPs, if
71. These problems are more common than they ought to be due to the
DEP's policy of allowing unqualified managers or engineers to review projects
instead of using qualified Watershed protection engineers. See supra note 53
and accompanying text.
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the BMPs don't work, then we should redesign the BMPs.
But it wouldn't make sense for us to give them a ticket."
Stasiuk is now in charge of all of the DEP's Watershed
enforcement. 72
72. Recent Watershed history is a pantheon of tales about miscalculations
and mistakes by DEP engineers and non-engineers exercising oversight of Wa-
tershed construction projects. When the projects go awry, the last thing the
engineer wants is an enforcement action against the developer which might
shine light on his own incompetence or inattention. Consider the following
from the DEP's recent history. In each of these cases, the problems were caused
when mechanical, structural and chemical engineers attempted to act as envi-
ronmental engineers:
" Hunter Brook-B J's Wholesale Club Sources Division engineers approved
BJ's Wholesale Club in Yorktown in 1994. Construction began soon thereaf-
ter, and serious siltation problems immediately followed. The impact on
Hunter Brook was so aggravated that the Town of Yorktown issued a stop
work order and served a summons on BJ's. The DEP's Steve Marino, who is
not a qualified protection engineer, visited the site and told the town engi-
neer he would develop a remediation plan for the stream, but he failed to do
so. Numerous citizen phone calls to Marino were ignored. The DEP brought
no enforcement action and Marino received a promotion. Marino never de-
veloped the remediation plan.
" Harrison Intake Construction In 1994, Harrison began constructing an in-
take in Rye Lake to draw water from the aqueduct. Unqualified Sources
Division engineers who were meant to carefully monitor the project dropped
the ball. Harrison's contractor made a mountain of silt while dredging the
bottom. The silt ran into the reservoir, causing a massive sediment cloud.
No tickets were issued, no prosecution or investigation occurred.
" Westchester Airport Extension Rather than assigning a competent environ-
mental engineer to review the stormwater plan for the Westchester County
Airport extension, the DEP managers assigned Dale Borchert, a geologist.
Borchert is neither an engineer nor qualified in hydrology. A stormwater
retention basin on airport property that Borchert approved failed because it
was improperly designed. An experienced engineer would have caught the
design flaw. The basin's failure resulted in turbidity loading to the Kensico
Reservoir.
" Somers Golf Course In 1992, Carl Picha, Head of East of Hudson District
Engineers, inexplicably issued a septic permit to the developers of Somers
Golf Course. Jim Roberts tried to stop this action but was removed from the
project. Picha's fatal action had the effect of ending the DEP's involvement
in the SEQRA process. Once the septic system was approved, the DEP had
very little influence over other important issues, such as stormwater. The
result of the DEP's blundering is a continuing catastrophic discharge of
sediment into the Muscoot and Amawalk Reservoir. In 1994 New York City
Corporation Counsel belatedly brought a series of quixotic legal actions
aimed at forcing the developer to remediate the site. Each of these failed
because of the original mistakes Picha made in abdicating the DEP's au-
thority under SEQRA.
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The incidence of such conflicts of interest will worsen as
unqualified City engineers increase their involvement with
construction, design and operation of local sewage treatment
plants. The new regulations require close DEP involvement
in all Watershed sewage treatment plants. The DEP will be
required to finance installation and maintenance of micro-fil-
tration and phosphate removal at each plant. The DEP engi-
neers will be involved in approvals of each project. The DEP's
engineering approvals or failure to provide adequate financ-
ing is likely to be raised as a defense to almost any action
against a Watershed sewage treatment plant for polluting.
Therefore, it is critical that the DEP segregate its protection
and enforcement functions from its facility engineering man-
agement function.
III. The Watershed Inspectors
A. Enforcers or Janitors?
Until recently, the Watershed inspectors reported to the
district engineers. Under the DEP's proposed reorganization,
inspectors will report directly to former chief of the Sources
Division George Mekenian's protge, Thom Hook, a man
" Patterson Village Condominiums A sewage treatment plant serving this de-
velopment was reviewed and approved by the DEP supervisor Paul
Agarwall, P.E., a structural engineer unqualified to perform this work. The
sewage plant has failed and the DEP is contracting an outside consultant to
solve the problem.
" Fence at Kensico In 1995, when Sources Division ordered the hasty con-
struction of a fence around the Kensico, the fence contractor illegally dis-
turbed stream beds and filled wetlands. No tickets were issued to the
builder and no investigation resulted that could have further embarrassed
the Sources Division managers who had ordered the construction without
proper oversight or supervision.
" Spruce Hill Development Ineptitude at Sources Division allowed the con-
struction of the Spruce Hill Development in Mt. Pleasant. The developer
who illegally and deliberately filled a principle Kensico Reservoir feeder
stream with contaminated fill was never criminally prosecuted by the DEP.
" Other recent examples where project review by unqualified DEP engineers
or non-engineers resulted in environmental disasters include Meadow Crest
Development, which caused major turbidity problems in the West Branch
Reservoir and the Westchester Airport Thee Cutting and the Malcolm Brook
sedimentation, which caused turbidity problems in the Kensico.
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whose expertise lies in the area of water delivery, not Water-
shed protection.
Until recently, the inspectors' foremost duty was to pro-
vide a critical front line of defense for Watershed protection.
New York City's Watershed inspectors patrol Watershed
roads looking for illegal dumping, chemical spills, tree cutting
and other sources of reservoir pollution. They investigate
septic failures, examine proposed septic systems, conduct am-
bient water monitoring and routine inspection and effluent
monitoring of the 112 sewage treatment plants that dis-
charge into New York City's water supply. However, the in-
spectors' ability to do anything about pollution is increasingly
tenuous. Although they are front line Watershed enforcers,
the DEP has never petitioned to obtain peace officer status
for the Watershed inspectors. When inspectors do encounter
polluters, they lack the authority to make arrests, issue sum-
monses, interview witnesses or make reports to a local Dis-
trict Attorney's office. "It's all done by bluff," said one of the
older inspectors recently. "If anyone ever questioned us or
checked on us, it would all fall to pieces. We have no more
authority than any other citizen!"73 The inspectors claim
that the district and managing engineers withdrew their au-
thority because of hostility toward enforcement. "The district
engineers, Boek and Cloonan, didn't want us to have that
power, they saw it as a challenge to their little fiefdom and
they made sure we didn't get it." 74 Poor management and
confusion about their mission has resulted in high levels of
job dissatisfaction and constant turnover among the
inspectors.
In 1992, the DEP reclassified its inspectors as maintain-
ers. (The term "inspector" is now only an internal DEP
designation). This reclassification was designed to institu-
tionalize the authority of the district and managing engineers
73. Personal communication with author.
74. Peace officer status is obtained by act of the legislature. Peace officers
are not required to carry weapons. (Dog wardens, meter readers, and building
inspectors are examples of unarmed peace officers). Peace officer status would
give the inspectors the authority to write tickets, issue summonses and to order
Watershed polluters to cease and desist.
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over the unit and will further erode the enforcement role of
the inspectors. The maintainers' title may bar the inspectors
from obtaining peace officer status. It immediately changed
their status from enforcement to janitorial. Maintainers can
be ordered to mow a lawn, paint buildings, or fix a door.
Without official enforcement agency status, the inspec-
tors have been hindered by a confused mission and evolved
into an errand service for the engineers. Under Thom Hook's
management, inspectors frequently find themselves running
trivial errands delivering mail, making coffee runs for the
managing engineers, picking up payroll, and otherwise being
"shanghaied for every stupid little job that comes up."75 The
perception that inspectors are gophers for the district and
managing engineers has given rise to low morale and resent-
ment and a considerable migration of the unit's most talented
individuals to other units at the DEP.76
What has become of vital ground level enforcement?
Theoretically, an inspector who witnesses a pollution crime
or violation can call in the police to handle enforcement. In
practice, this is ineffective for two reasons. First, due to the
ubiquitous nature of illegal pollution only the most serious
criminal matters are addressed. As a result, many failing
septics, broken construction berms and illegal hook-ups are
left unattended. Second, the hostility toward enforcement
and police by the engineers who oversee the inspection unit,
means that there is inadequate coordination or communica-
tion between the police and inspectors. Thom Hook has di-
rected the district engineers not to alert the police unless
cleared through him.77
A typical example occurred in June 1996, when the DEP
inspectors finally closed the United States Post Office in the
Catskill Hamlet of Denver. The inspectors evicted a number
of other tenants after discovering that the building's landlord
had illegally installed a sneak sewer pipe discharging directly
into the nearby Batavia Kill Creek. This creek is a principle
75. Personal communication with author.
76. See id.
77. Personal interview conducted by author.
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feeder tributary to the East Branch Reservoir. Instead of im-
mediately notifying the police, closing down the discharge,
and fining or jailing the violator, the district engineer allowed
it to continue for months. The district engineer finally took
action after the landlord ignored repeated notices of violation
issued by Watershed inspectors and frequent public com-
plaints about the stench.78 However, the district engineer
elected to keep the information from Watershed police who
were never informed of the violations or the DEP action until
they read news notices describing the incident. 79 Hostility is
so great between engineers and police that upon discovering
a serious pollution incident, district engineers are far more
likely to notify the DEC rather than the department's own
police.80
B. Lack of Training
Neophyte inspectors are given no training in enforce-
ment or environmental protection. Most of them are not en-
vironmentally trained or do not have the engineering
background to make qualified determinations about septic
systems that they are frequently called upon to make.
Mainly because of their confused mission which waivers be-
tween the judicial and janitorial, new inspectors are typically
put on the job without so much as a job description and are
often paired with equally inexperienced colleagues. One
freshman inspector described his training, "[oln day one, I
was put with another inspector who was hired one month
before me. We drove around in a car and taught each other
the job. Neither of us knew anything-we were given almost
no instructions. We drove aimlessly and ran errands for the
78. Personal interview conducted by author.
79. Personal interview conducted by author.
80. In May of 1996, when an Ulster County commercial bakery, Bread
Alone, was caught bypassing its treatment system and discharging illegally,
Catskill Engineer, Joe Boek, called DEC Engineer Cesar Manfredi before noti-
fying the DEP police.
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engineers. When we asked our supervisors about training,
they told us 'maybe later.' It was like a joke."81
C. Emergency Response: A Low Priority
The low priority assigned to the inspectors' pollution pre-
vention mission by Thom Hook and the district engineers has
jeopardized emergency services in the Watershed. Prior to
Hook's promotion, key personnel on the inspectors' emer-
gency response team were issued radio equipment and de-
partment vehicles that allowed emergency response
personnel to maintain radio contact with Sources Protection
en route to spill sites. Radio contact kept the team informed
about spill status, traffic problems and other particulars that
enhanced response. Hook reassigned those vehicles to nones-
sential personnel, forcing the inspectors to lose valuable time
since they are now forced to use their own cars or go to the
DEP offices to obtain emergency response vehicles.
IV. The Watershed Police
A. A Sad Enforcement History
The police are probably the most effective section of all
the units involved in managing and protecting the upstate
water supply. Over the past several years, the police have
conducted hundreds of environmental investigations leading
to criminal arrests. Since Watershed inspectors have no real
enforcement authority and are controlled by the DEP manag-
ing engineers who are hostile to enforcement, most pollution
enforcement is left to the Watershed police.
The DEP Watershed police force was established in 1908,
as one of four independent bureaus that made up the Board
of Water Supply. The first Chief of Patrol, Rhinelander
81. Personal communication with author. A recent audit by New York City
Comptroller Alan Hevesi criticizes the Inspectors Unit for chronic lack of super-
vision. See 1996 COMPTROLLER's AuDIT, supra note 34, at 5. Such lack of super-
vision accounted for a fifty million gallon discharge of unchlorinated water to
New York City on May 26, 1996, when two Watershed inspectors neglected to
change chlorine jars. The following day, the DEP's lab tests showed the pres-
ence of fecal coliform within the distribution system. The spill was covered up
by Thom Hook.
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Waldo (later appointed Police Commissioner for the City of
New York) reported directly to the Water Board Commis-
sioner. The police officers were charged with protecting the
aqueducts and enforcing the New York City Watershed regu-
lations issued under Public Health Law. In subsequent
years, the police force lost its independence and was placed
under the authority of Watershed engineers-a disposition
which led to the cessation of all anti-pollution enforcement.
Between 1960 and 1989, no polluters were issued tickets by
the DEP Police.8 2 Citing fear of adverse reaction in the Wa-
tershed communities, the DEP's managing engineers largely
abdicated its authority to prosecute reservoir polluters. A
1991 report by the City Department of Investigations (DOI)
found that the Sources Division encouraged Watershed police
to carry out activities outside the scope of their mission such
as issuing traffic tickets. Police officers who initiated investi-
gations of Watershed pollution were warned by their superi-
ors to drop the investigations "or" Police Administrator
Patrick Murphy, a licensed engineer, warned them, "you'll be
sitting at a desk for the rest of your career."8 3
In 1991, several DEP officers including Private Ron
Gatto testified before a City Council hearing that they had
been ordered by Sources Division Chief George Mekenian and
Police Administrator Patrick Murphy to drop criminal and
civil investigations of Watershed polluters including the Bed-
ford Correctional Facility and Putnam Hospital.8 4
As a result of the disclosures at that hearing, Murphy
was transferred and Mekenian was forced out of the DEP.
82. In 1990, Riverkeeper sued the DEP under the State Freedom of Infor-
mation Law to obtain arrest records for the DEP Watershed police. An exami-
nation of those records showed that there had never been a single arrest,
summons or ticket issued to a polluter during the three previous decades.
83. Personal Interview with Captain Ronald Gatto, DEP police (January
1996).
84. On Oct. 9, 1991, New York City Council President Andrew Stein con-
ducted public hearings on the DEP's enforcement policy against polluters in the
New York City Watershed. Three Watershed police officers appeared at those
hearings and testified that they had been repeatedly and consistently ordered
by their superiors at the DEP to avoid arresting or ticketing polluters. Below is
a typical exchange from the hearing transcript:
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Enforcement finally became a reality only when the police
were removed from oversight by engineers and allowed to re-
port directly to the DEP Commissioner, Albert Appleton.
Michael Collins was brought from outside the department to
initiate a new enforcement ethic85 and Gatto was promoted to
lieutenant and personally conducted over 130 successful envi-
ronmental arrests over the next three years. During the
early days of the Giuliani Administration, the police found
themselves again reporting to engineer Warren Neuberger.
Worried about this development, New York City Public Advo-
cate Mark Green sent a letter to the DEP Commissioner
Marilyn Gelber on May 16, 1994, complaining,
I am concerned, in particular, that Watershed inspectors
and police are supervised by DEP's Sources Division,
which is staffed primarily by engineers and technical ex-
perts. I suggest that the Chief of Watershed Police should
report directly to you.
Gelber wrote back promising that the police would report di-
rectly to her.
To the great surprise of many within Sources Division,
the DEP police's aggressive anti-pollution campaign was
greeted not with resentment, but rather with strong support
within the Watershed communities. Many upstate papers
published favorable articles about the Watershed police and
... On three separate occasions, Mr. McKenyon [sic] and
Mr. Murphy have ordered me not to make an arrest on
three investigations I had conducted and found to be
directly polluting New York City's water supply system
And they ordered you not to make arrests?
On three separate occasions.
When you knew that there were environmental
violations that were taking place?
Not only knew, I had verified the violations by lab
testing.
That's a very serious thing and a very serious charge and
it's something that I will forward to the district attorney
and the City Department of Investigations ....
85. See City Appoints New Water Supply Police Director, NYC DEP NEWS,
Aug. 1, 1996.
Officer Gatto:
Mr. Stein:
Officer Gatto:
Mr. Stein:
Officer Gatto:
Mr. Stein:
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pollution arrests received positive press attention.8 6
86. See e.g., Man Accused of Dumping Sewage From Katonah Cafg, GAN-
NETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, 1992; Car Dealer Denies Toxic Dumping, GAN-
NETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, Aug. 4, 1993; Pollution Crackdown, GANNETT
SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, 1993; Cop Guards the Drink, GANNETT SUBURBAN
NEWSPAPERS, 1993; Signs Posted to Protect Water Supply Areas, NEW YORK
POST, 1993; Water Police Target Pollution, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS,
1993; 100 Fresh Faces, DAILY NEWS, 1994; Aerial Septic Survey Still Flies in the
Face of Putnam, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, Mar. 16, 1994; Putnam
Landowners Sue City for $9 Billion Over Land Regs - Compromise Goal in Wa-
tershed Dispute, NORTH COUNTY NEWS, Apr. 6-12, 1994; Croton Aqueduct Shut-
down Causes Water to Turn Brown, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, Sept. 3,
1994; Water Scare Shuts Down Key City Reservoir, NEW YORK POST, Sept. 8,
1994; Riverkeeper Threatens to Sue Yorktown - Sewage Discharge Into Water
Issue, NORTH COUNTY NEWS, Sept. 21, 1994; Yorktown Accused of Polluting
NYC Reservoir, REPORTER DISPATCH, Sept. 22, 1994; Crisis in the Water Zone,
THE OBSERVATORY, Sept. 26, 1994; It's a Dumping Ground, REPORTER Dis-
PATCH, Oct. 24, 1994; The Hero of the Watershed, BEDFORD RECORD, Dec. 29,
1994; Man's Body Found Near Cross River Reservoir, REPORTER DISPATCH,
1994; Contractor To Answer Charge of Installing Illegal Septic Tank, REPORTER
DISPATCH, 1994; Runoff From Golf Course Worries Residents, GANNETT SUBUR-
BAN NEWSPAPERS, NOV. 6, 1995; Oilman's Widow Axed For Larch Amount of
Trouble, NEW YORK POST, Jan. 5, 1995; NYC Considers A Water Executive With
a Murky Past, NEW YORK OBSERVER, Jan. 9, 1995; How Safe Is Our Water?,
NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Jan. 16, 1995, at 24; NYC Swings $1M Legal Ax Over
Alleged Tree Removal, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, Jan. 7, 1995; Gatto
Receives Environmental Award, OUR TOWN, May 2, 1995; Gatto Announces Su-
pervisor Interest, NORTH COUNTY NEWS, May 17, 1995; Kennedy Backing of
Gatto Centers on Water Concerns, NORTH COUNTY NEWS, May 17, 1995; Survey
to Seek Failing Septics, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, 1995; Building
Owner Cited in Connection With Leak of Sewage Into Reservoir, REPORTER DIS-
PATCH, 1995; Sewage Often Dumped Into Reservoir Streams, N.Y. POST, 1995;
Suit Says Towns Soil City Water, DAILY NEWS, 1995; Watershed Police Protect
What New York City Drinks, N.Y. TIMES, 1995; Wily Coydog, NEW YORK MAGA-
ZINE, May 6, 1996, at 16; Developer Is Ordered to Restore Stream, NEW YORK
TIMES, Jun. 2, 1996; DEP's Gatto Honored for Saving Trout Stream, Enviro.
Work Yorktowner Pursues Water Polluters, NORTH COUNTY NEWS, Jun. 19,
1996; Let the River Run, INSTYLE MAGAZINE, July 1996; Restaurant Owner
Fined $5G for Dumping Sewage, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, Aug. 4,
1996; Watershed Police Crack Down On Polluters, REPORTER DISPATCH, Aug. 23,
1996; Gov Thirsts for Passage of Clean Water Bond, N.Y. POST, Sept. 9, 1996;
Civic & Citizens - New Idea, A Common Ground - Lt. Gatto Awarded Environ-
mental Cop of the Year, Nov. 1996, at 47; Mattress Dumper Arrested Following
Chase, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, 1996; Restaurant Cited After Sewage
Flows Into Croton River, GANNETT SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, May 1, 1997; Letters
to the Editor - State and Local Agencies Swiftly Address Fish Kill, GANNETT
SUBURBAN NEWSPAPERS, 1997; Tom Anderson, Water Protection: Is the City Up
to Job?, REPORTER DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1997, at 16A; Joel A. Miele Sr., DEP
Vigorously Protecting Its Reservoirs, REPORTER DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1997.
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Although some upstate communities have organized to fight
tougher Watershed regulations, enforcement of the anti-pollu-
tion laws has wide public support within those communities.
Today the largest threat to the DEP police, and in turn to
a viable Watershed enforcement program, is a waning sense
of mission as facilities/operational engineers reassert control
over the DEP police force and complete the dismantling of the
inspection program. After a brief flurry of aggressive enforce-
ment in the early 1990s, the DEP appears to be wavering in
its support of the police campaign of anti-pollution
enforcement.
B. An EPA Deliverable Ignored
The EPA's Filtration Avoidance Determination required
the creation of an Environmental Enforcement Unit by 1993.
This unit is intended to investigate complaints and gather in-
telligence through sector patrols and target illegal dumping,
sewage discharges, illegal storage of hazardous materials,
spills and other environmental offenses. The unit, which op-
erated briefly, has quietly disbanded. Although it still exists
on paper, the unit does not exist in the real world.
The only officer currently assigned to pollution patrol of
the City's 2000 square mile Watershed east and west of the
Hudson is, once again, Ron Gatto. Most of the police have
been removed from sector patrol and reassigned to security
patrol or fixed security post at the gate houses.8 7 The DEP
87. Personal communication with author. While gate house security is im-
portant to meet the heightened threat of terrorist attack, the assignment of
these officers to gate house security does very little to reduce the system's vul-
nerability to terrorism. Current assignments have two officers, untrained in
anti-terrorism, sitting on lawn chairs with .45 caliber pistols giving the system
no more protection than did the private security company they relieved. The
officers themselves are sitting targets and bored to tears. If the City is serious
about confronting the terrorist threat, it should deliberately and systematically
develop a genuine anti-terrorist security system including ten foot anchor-
hockey fence with concertina wire, video surveillance and other appropriate
measures around the gate houses and balancing reservoirs (Kensico and Hill-
view). See also 1996 COMPTROLLER'S AUDIT, supra note 34. After noting an
alarming incident where an inspector observed graffitti on a water chamber
wall within the distribution system, indicating that trespassers have little
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intends to assign all nine new officers to gate house duty at
Hillview Reservoir to replace contract security guards.88
C. A New Regime, An Old Story
Under the new reorganization, the police are again re-
porting to an engineer, Deputy Commissioner Stasiuk, at the
Bureau of Water Supply Quality and Protection, instead of
directly to the DEP Commissioner. Deputy Commissioner
Stasiuk has no police or military police background. There is
evidence that the DEP police's enforcement mission has al-
ready been compromised. Deputy Commissioner Stasiuk has
made a series of statements to Riverkeeper representatives
and others within the DEP indicating his personal and philo-
sophical aversion to aggressive enforcement.8 9 For example,
efforts by Ron Gatto to conduct an investigation against Dan-
bury Pharmacol, one of the reservoir system's few industrial
polluters, was stymied by Stasiuk's delay in approving this
investigation. On May 23, 1996, Gatto was ordered to drop
the investigation and turn it over to the managing engineers.
Gatto was subsequently ordered to drop his investigation of
Yonkers Contracting, a City contractor engaged in sediment
pollution of the Muscoot Reservoir. 90
D. Lack of Training
Although police officers are trained in enforcement tech-
niques by the State Police Academy, they receive no formal
training in pollution control or investigation.
E. Deficient Salaries
Given the key role they play, the police are grossly un-
derpaid. An officer's starting salary is $23,000 a year. In
contrast, the DEP recently advertised an opening for an as-
trouble gaining access to the facility, the Comptroller's audit makes specific rec-
ommendations for improved security. See id. at 18.
88. Based upon personal communication with author.
89. Based on various interviews and conversations with Dr. Stasiuk.
90. Riverkeeper is aware of the disposition in these cases due to its role in
reporting them to the DEP police. There may well be other similar cases of
which we are not aware.
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sistant word processor with a starting salary of almost
$26,000. As a result of low pay,91 the police have lost at least
twenty-five officers to other police departments during the
past five years. The City spends almost $6,000-$8,000 per
person to train officers at the Westchester County Police
Academy, but loses the benefit of the officers' training to
other police departments that are more than happy to employ
a fully-trained officer.92
Although the DEP's top salary for an officer is $30,565, in
reality, an officer's pay never advances beyond the bottom of
the salary range.93 Comparable police departments' starting
salaries are around $30,000 with frequent raises that typi-
cally have the officer achieving top salary of $45,000 within
three years, thus the DEP's top salary for an officer is lower
than the starting salary in many police departments. 94 For
these reasons, the DEP has a constant turnover of the best
and brightest officers to other police departments. This
"brain drain" has a detrimental effect on the Watershed since
inexperienced officers form the bulk of the workforce.
V. Facility Compliance Group
A. Enforcement: A Low Priority
The DEP's Facilities Compliance Group is charged with
monitoring and maintaining compliance at the 112 sewage
treatment plants that discharge into the New York City
water supply. Lynn Sadosky and Dave Rider lead the group
on the east and west sides of the Hudson respectively.
Though Sadosky is a civil engineer, she has no advanced was-
91. See 1996 COMPTROLLER'S AUDIT, supra note 34, at 21-23. The Comptrol-
lers Audit found that 62% of officers who resigned during the ten year period
between 1986 and 1996 became police officers for other county jurisdictions and
that 51% of the officers who left the DEP worked there for less than two years.
The audit states, "[tihe Director of the DEP police unit informed us that DEP
police officers' low starting salaries and their lack of raises were the main rea-
son for the high turnover rate." Id. at 21. Five DEP officers who had been on
the force for over ten years were earning only $23,563 per year. See id. at 22.
92. See id. at 23.
93. See id. at 21.
94. See id. at 22.
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tewater treatment education. 95 This group inspects the
sewer plants and conducts its own monitoring program sam-
pling effluent from each plant four times a year. The DEP's
own tests demonstrate that roughly twenty-five percent of
the 112 Watershed sewage treatment plants violate their per-
mits96 in any particular month. Sadosky has preserved the
institutional culture of antagonism toward the DEP's enforce-
ment mission. 97 Sadosky and Rider are so hostile toward en-
vironmental enforcement that their unit has never turned
95. Although there are qualified engineers among them, none of this unit's
managers or supervisors are qualified with an educational background in was-
tewater treatment. This discipline commonly, though not always, requires at
least an M.S. in "environmental engineering," which is the modern term for
sanitary engineering. It may be possible for a civil engineer to become profi-
cient in sanitary engineering, but this requires substantial experience and
study which neither Sadosky nor Rider have.
96. See, e.g., SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT SUMMARY REPORTS, EAST OF HUD-
SON, May 23, 1996 (compiled by the "Environmental Programs, Facility Compli-
ance Group" and listing the SPDES violations reported to DEP by sewage
treatment plants within the Watershed). It is even more alarming that when
material differences appear between the Discharge Monitoring Reports submit-
ted by each sewage treatment plant and the DEP's own independent testing
results, the DEP does not report these differences to the DEC, the primary en-
forcement authority for such plants. Despite the fact that the DEP's testing
routinely indicates violations not reflected in DMR's submitted by the treat-
ment plants, the DEP takes no action to assist the states efforts to enforce its
SPDES permit limitations. See Alan G. Hevesi, AUDIT REPORT ON THE NEW
YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION REGULATORY COMPLI-
ANCE AND INSPECTION UNIT at 26-28, June 30, 1997 (on file with author). The
DEP responded indignantly to the Comptroller's audit, "[tihe report fails to
state how this would improve the enforcement strategy for a facility or docu-
ment DEP's obligation to do so promptly." Id. at 28.
97. Sources Division was so averse to strong enforcement that it allowed
these plants to violate for years without paying fines or agreeing to comply with
their permits. Yorktown's municipal sewage treatment plant has violated its
permit consistently for twenty years. During a brief moment of bravado, the
Dinkins Administration finally sued Yorktown in federal court. That bold move
was followed by a hasty relapse into atrophy. The DEP's 1990 Clean Water Act
lawsuit has languished in adjournment for five years while Yorktown continues
to pollute. By its own admission, the Bedford Correctional Facility violated its
permit 10,000 times between 1987 and 1991 with no enforcement response from
the DEP whatsoever. Along with Yorktown's sewage treatment plant, Putnam
County Hospital, Holly Stream Development, Patterson Village Condominiums,
K'Hal Adas, Mahopac High School and others all regularly violate the Clean
Water Act polluting the New York City reservoirs, yet none has been fined or
agreed to comprehensive consent orders to achieve permit compliance. (A fed-
eral lawsuit by Riverkeeper forced the state to construct an $11 million plant
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any violators over to DEP police.98 This is evident despite the
fact that their own discharge monitoring records expose doz-
ens of chronic environmental law breakers each quarter.99
Sadosky outlined her enforcement priorities in a memo
written July 22, 1996, to the DEP's supervising engineers,
entitled "Employees Who Become Environmental Liabilities,
Spotting the Signs of a Problem Employee, Resolving the Is-
sues In the Workplace." 100 The memo reveals the DEP man-
agement's concern about rooting out whistleblowers rather
than focusing on environmental protection.
Sadosky first warned her fellow supervisors of the "prob-
lem employee" who she says, "may subject [environmental]
employees to liability for legal violations, and in some cases,
criminal charges." She also wrote:
Because of the 'special' problems presented by these em-
ployees, it is important to detect problems and deal with
them early on to avoid or reduce liability .... The first step
is dealing with these employees in recognizing them before
they generate significant problems .... Problem environ-
mental employees frequently have an inflated sense of self-
righteousness-an attitude that they somehow care more
about the environment than their co-workers do .... In
addition, they are likely to inform other regulatory agen-
cies or other outside groups (i.e. DEC, Riverkeeper, Trout
Unlimited, etc.) about alleged violations at facilities where
they work. 10 1
The inescapable implication of the final sentence is that the
"new" DEP under Stasiuk has not progressed very far from
renovation of the Bedford Correctional STP in 1991. That plant now complies
with federal and state laws).
98. Personal interview conducted by author.
99. In contrast to the DEP's practices, New Jersey DEP levies fines for any
violation at a sewer treatment plant and for failed septic systems. New York
City DEP has never levied a fine against STP, no matter how egregious the
violation!
100. See supra note 31. Sadosky's memo quotes from an article written for
companies which might violate federal or state environmental standards, but
she completely distorts the intended meaning by applying it to the DEP con-
cepts intended for the regulated community.
101. See id.
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the department's traditional paranoia about public exposure
of illegal activities at its own sewer plants.10 2
Sadosky's group continues the old traditions of secrecy
and inaction. Instead of turning polluters over to the police,
the unit "files and forgets" its monitoring reports after mail-
ing a copy to state DEC engineers. Because the DEC lacks
enforcement personnel and its internal policy guidelines re-
quire it to treat Watershed sewer plants as low priority "non-
significant" violators, these polluters are assured that they
will receive no enforcement attention.
B. Poor Testing Protocols
Nowhere is the DEP's anti-enforcement bias more evi-
dent than in the sewage treatment plant testing protocols.
Each of the 112 sewage treatment plants, pursuant to a state/
federal Clean Water Act State Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permit, discharges into the Watershed.
These permits allow the discharge of small quantities of sev-
eral pollutants, and impose regular sampling and reporting
protocols to be performed by the permittee to determine its
compliance.' 0 3 Under the Clean Water Act, the DEP has au-
thority to prosecute violations. 10 4 However, under this law
no discharge violation can be shown except by using the test-
ing protocols prescribed in the permit. Instead of testing ac-
cording to these permit guidelines, the DEP uses its own
testing protocols which are useless in court cases. Sadosky
and her predecessors have obstinately persisted in refusing to
conform their protocols to federal and state standards (de-
spite repeated pleas to do so). The DEP as an enforcement
and regulatory body appears to be plagued by disinclination
to prosecute even chronic violators.
102. See, e.g., Discharge Monitoring Reports for New York City owned sew-
age treatment plants (on file with author).
103. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] (CWA)
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
104. See id. § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
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C. Failure to Investigate Reporting Discrepancies
Discrepancies frequently occur between test results re-
ported by the DEP compliance personnel and sewage treat-
ment plants' reported results. This could be the result of
false reporting or other deceptive reporting practices that are
not criminal. Due to the possibility of criminal activity, such
reporting discrepancies, when discovered by the facilities
compliance group, should be immediately turned over to the
police for investigation. Furthermore, facilities compliance
personnel do not systematically conduct their own investiga-
tion of reporting discrepancies. This omission allows false re-
porting, in some cases, to go on for years with no official
response.
Immediate intervention by the DEP can help solve seri-
ous water quality problems. For example, its own records
show that the Putnam County Hospital's sewer plant, which
discharges into the new Croton Reservoir, is generally in
compliance with its permit. However, the DEP's sampling re-
sults suggest that the hospital regularly violates permit stan-
dards. These discrepancies, which continued for years, were
uncovered in 1995 when Riverkeeper compared the DEP's
monitoring results with the hospital's own discharge reports.
Riverkeeper also discovered that the hospital's regular viola-
tions were easily cured through small operating and mainte-
nance improvements. If the DEP had routinely compared
results and investigated discrepancies it could have promptly
identified and corrected such problems. As it is, easily cura-
ble problems often continue for years.
Another example is Yorktown, where for many years,
plant operators reported themselves in compliance with fecal
coliform levels while the DEP's results for the same period
showed excessive violations. Yorktown only confronted the
issue in 1995, when Riverkeeper sued the plant and de-
manded a criminal investigation by Westchester District At-
torney Jeannine Pirro. Prompted by the lawsuit, Yorktown
conducted an internal investigation and announced that it
had discovered that its contract lab had been collecting fecal
samples in alcohol contaminated jars that killed the bacteria
1997]
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before they were counted. Once Yorktown was aware of the
problems, it addressed its fecal violations. The DEP's failure
to engage in the simple exercise of comparing the plant's dis-
charge monitoring reports to its own test results resulted in
unnecessary harm to the Watershed that continued for years.
D. Contract Labs: A Lack of Vigilance
The Yorktown and Putnam examples also raise questions
about the standards applied to contract laboratories and con-
sulting operators retained by Watershed package plant oper-
ators. Routine comparisons by inspectors can expose these
labs and consultants where incompetence is a cause of sew-
age treatment failure or misreporting. Again, the facility
compliance group's failure to thoroughly investigate these in-
consistencies indicates that such problems cannot be
promptly solved.
E. Courtesy Calls
The DEP's facility compliance group routinely gives
plant operators a "courtesy call" prior to visiting the plant to
conduct effluent tests or for plant inspections.10 5 Sadosky
often gives plant operators as much as one week's notice
before inspections occur. Such calls give the operators time
to get their plants in order, thereby creating an inaccurate
picture of Watershed sewage treatment plant compliance.
This is not a technique employed by responsible enforcement
agencies.
VI. General Enforcement Issues
A. Lack of Public Outreach
1. Telephone Tag
Inspectors and police rely on their own observations and
patrols to uncover Watershed violations. Lack of public in-
volvement makes enforcement much less efficient. Public in-
volvement has been stymied because of the DEP's long
history of actively discouraging participation in Watershed
105. Personal communication with author.
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protection. Even today, people who call to report violations
find it difficult to locate the inspectors unit's telephone
number. Some DEP telephone operators at the headquarters
in Lefrak are unaware of the DEP's office in Valhalla. A Wa-
tershed community resident calling telephone information to
find the number of the New York City Watershed police or
the Watershed inspectors in Westchester County will be told
"they are not listed." Additionally, the DEP police (which op-
erates a 24-hour communication command center) is not
listed in any telephone book or in any police directories.
Those citizens with the ingenuity to find the inspector's
telephone number may be discouraged from calling by the
DEP's unsatisfactory response to the typical inquiry or com-
plaint: unreturned phone calls, disinterested DEP personnel
and lack of follow-up or of any indication that the complaint
is being systematically logged and addressed.
2. Signs and Hotlines
Inspectors would be more efficient and community in-
volvement would be enhanced if the DEP openly encouraged
public participation in Watershed protection. The Watershed
inspectors should spearhead a public outreach program in-
cluding bag-a-polluter hotline, advertising and school and
community lectures. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
New Jersey, large highway signs inform drivers when they
are entering a drinking supply Watershed. New York has
tiny, virtually unreadable signs, on only a few roads. If the
DEP has a pollution reporting hotline, it is unknown to the
public and unlisted in the phone directory.
A pollution reporting hotline and sign inviting public
participation and awareness would help Watershed residents
feel that they are part of the partnership to protect the sys-
tem. Such efforts would undoubtedly improve relationships
between Watershed residents and City employees who are
often viewed as aloof and invisible.
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3. Sector Patrols
The inspectors and police should be required to partici-
pate not just in road patrols, but should conduct foot and ca-
noe patrols and stream walks. Such "sector patrols" are
required as a deliverable in the EPA Filtration Avoidance De-
termination, but have inexplicably been discontinued by po-
lice and inspection units. Most reservoir streams are
inaccessible from the road; however, they are frequent vec-
tors for pollution. 10 6 The banks of reservoir streams like the
Beaver Dam Creek in Westchester County bristle with illegal
drains from laundry machines, septic systems, drains from
farming and feed operations, construction sites, and illegal
dumps. Most residents, if informed of their violations by a
uniformed inspector, would immediately correct them. In ad-
dition, inspectors conducting such foot patrols would encoun-
ter fishermen and other members of the interested public and
have the opportunity to enlist them in the Watershed protec-
tion partnership.
B. Lack of Independence
Traditionally, law enforcement decision-making is segre-
gated from control by political officials and civilian bureau-
crats because of the rapidity with which law enforcement
decisions become political decisions.' 0 7 A disastrous experi-
ment with civilian control of police activities in the early
1900s led to the general conclusion in the United States that
civilian control of police work was an "either-or" proposition
"either [civilian officials] control the police and politics influ-
ence law enforcement, or the police are left alone and politics
do not affect law enforcement."' 08 As a result of such exper-
iences, virtually every community nationwide has eliminated
civilian interference with police departments. Predictably, ci-
106. See Douglas Kennedy, Sewage often Dumped into Reservoir Streams,
N.Y. POST, Sept. 10, 1994.
107. See R. FOGELSON, BIG CITY POLICE 13-15 (1977).
108. Gregory Howard Williams, Police Discretion-Who is in Charge?, 68
Iowa L. Rev. 431 (1983).
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vilian control of the DEP police has introduced political con-
sideration in almost all enforcement decisions.
Political influence and factors other than water quality
preservation have always hindered the DEP's enforcement
mission. For example, in May 1991, the DEP Sources Divi-
sion leaders prevented Watershed police from issuing a sum-
mons against the Bedford Hills State Prison for dumping tons
of sewage sludge on the banks of a Muscoot Reservoir tribu-
tary, even though the prison officials were caught.
Political sensitivity almost led to a disaster at the
Yeshiva Farm Settlement in January 1996, when Hepatitis A
was discovered in fifteen failing septic systems at the Settle-
ment. Apparently, these septic systems had failed for at least
two years, and continue to fail, but the Watershed inspectors
and the DEP police were ordered not to take any samples of
these systems.10 9 The DEP only took action after an anony-
mous tip revealed that Hepatitis A may be detected in the
septic systems. Meanwhile, these failing septics were con-
taminating the Kisco River and the City's drinking water
supply.
VII. Recommendations
A. The Inspectors
1. The DEP should merge inspector units with the po-
lice force to form a single environmental enforcement unit as
contemplated by the EPA Filtration Avoidance Order. The
new division should be organized under a Director of Enforce-
ment who reports directly to the DEP commissioner. This
change would bring the DEP into conformance with other en-
vironmental agencies, like the DEC, which customarily main-
tains separate enforcement units.
2. In any case, the inspectors should be given peace of-
ficer status so that they can issue summonses when appropri-
ate. The DEP requires a large team of ground level
enforcement troops with training to recognize environmental
violations (e.g. failing septic systems and improper erosion
109. Based on various interviews conducted by author.
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controls at construction sites) and the authority to ticket vio-
lators. These peace officers should report more serious envi-
ronmental crimes directly to the DEP police and not through
intermediary managers. If this enforcement force cannot be
created out of the existing maintainers unit, the DEP should
create a new independent enforcement group responsible for
monitoring compliance at sewage treatment plants and con-
ducting field patrols and investigations. Enforcement staff
should report directly to the DEP commissioner. To the ex-
tent inspectors are needed to perform non-enforcement tasks
under engineering supervision (e.g. ambient water testing
and percolation hole testing for determining permeability of
proposed septic fields) these functions should be transferred
to a separate protection unit working with Watershed protec-
tion engineers. Most importantly, due to an inherent conflict
of interest, no enforcement staff should report to facility or
district engineers.
3. Inspectors should be formally trained in pollution
control law and investigation. Training should include in-
struction about how to recognize and detect illegal sewer
hook-ups and broken septic systems. Inspectors should work
closely with environmental protection engineers.
B. The Police
4. Police should be given environmental enforcement
training including such basic pollution investigation tech-
niques as dye and smoke tests, sampling analysis, federal,
state and local environmental law and regulation, permit
reading and basic subsurface engineering sufficient to allow
them to recognize and detect illegal hook-ups, broken septic
systems sump pumps in septic systems and proper construc-
tion of berms and sediment barriers. (Caveat: once an illegal
activity is recognized, police officers and inspectors must con-
sult with qualified environmental protection engineers).
5. At a minimum, the DEP's Environmental Investiga-
tions Unit (an EPA Deliverable) should have fifteen to twenty
full time police detectives and the same number of inspectors
as well as full time laboratory support and one full time engi-
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neer. The unit should be independent and report directly to
the DEP commissioner. It is unacceptable that police officers
report to a managing engineer, whose job creates an inherent
direct conflict of interest in many criminal and civil enforce-
ment cases.
6. If the police are not allowed to report directly to the
commissioner, the DEP should consider officially relinquish-
ing responsibility for enforcement and transfer enforcement
units over to another agency; e.g., New York City Depart-
ment of Investigation, the new Watershed Inspector General
or the New York City police department.
7. Watershed police officers should be paid salaries
comparable to those at local law enforcement agencies.
8. All the DEP engineers and inspectors should be re-
quired to, as a matter of agency policy, make a record of all
environmental violations that they observe or discover during
the course of performing their duties and to report those vio-
lations to the police. The police should be required to log each
reported violation and the response. This is standard operat-
ing procedure for other agencies. It is good professional prac-
tice to provide important data about environmental crimes in
the Watershed.
C. Inspectors and Police
9. Inspectors and police should conduct sector patrols,
including walking tributary creeks and waterways within
their districts, searching for septic and other violations. The
inspectors and police should systematically inspect each
stream, wetland and shoreline within their assigned sectors.
They should investigate new construction projects and other
potential pollution sources. The DEP is currently in violation
of the EPA Filtration Avoidance Determination for failing to
implement sector patrols.
10. Ground level enforcement decisions should be insu-
lated as much as possible from political meddling.
11. The DEP should give preference to Watershed com-
munity residents when hiring inspectors and police.
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12. Police and inspectors should routinely log all com-
plaints and their responses.
D. The Environmental Facilities Unit
13. The environmental facility unit should expand its
testing frequencies at "problem" sewage plants and integrate
NPDES permit testing methodologies for each of the 112 Wa-
tershed sewage treatment plants into their own sampling
protocols. This should include installation of the DEP con-
trolled composite samplers at each plant.
14. The environmental facilities unit should routinely
compare their own effluent results with the discharge moni-
toring reports produced by each sewage treatment facility.
When apparent discrepancies exist between the DEP test re-
sults and the facility's reports, the DEP should automatically
report the discrepancy to the police for criminal investigation.
15. The environmental facilities unit should send copies
of all reports showing discharge violations to the Watershed
police.
16. The practice of giving "courtesy calls" to plant man-
agers prior to inspection and testing should be permanently
discontinued.
17. The DEP should routinely test sewage treatment
plants for non-NPDES permit pollutants that are a threat to
reservoir water quality, public health and filtration avoid-
ance. These pollutants include Giardia, Cryptosporidium,
cholera, typhoid, phosphorus, ammonia, radiation (barium
from Putnam Hospital), metals, and pesticides, where appro-
priate. Most Watershed plants are not currently required to
test for these parameters. Information about these parame-
ters will be useful to the DEP in obtaining permit modifica-
tions from the DEC. These tests will also be useful in
assessing reservoir pollution loading, and stream assimila-
tion capacities, and will provide baselines to measure the real
effectiveness of the regulations and new pollution control
technologies. In addition, it will provide information about
the real threats to public health and water quality posed by
the 112 sewage treatment plants in the Watershed.
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18. For sewage treatment plants that are chronic viola-
tors, the DEP should routinely collect upstream and down-
stream samples. These samples may be helpful in
determining downstream impacts, in prosecuting the polluter
in court, and in developing remediation plans during negotia-
tions or litigation.
19. Contract laboratories that test and sample for the
Watershed package plants should be certified by the state or
the DEP.
E. Project Review: Pollution Prevention
20. The DEP should create a pollution prevention unit
responsible for conducting project review, remediation and
environmental protection engineering in the Watershed.
This unit should report to the First Deputy Commissioner
and work closely with the DEP's enforcement staff. The unit
should be led by a qualified environmental protection engi-
neer and be independent from the delivery and district
engineer.
21. Watershed protection engineering should be recon-
structed to eliminate under-qualified or unqualified staff and
redefine duties. These engineers should be made public
health engineers. Environmentally qualified engineers
should manage this unit.
22. Watershed protection engineers should be permitted
to take and order samples when appropriate to ongoing inves-
tigations and should be allocated necessary laboratory
support.
F. Public Outreach
23. Highway signs on all state and federal highways
should announce:
You ARE NOW ENTERING A WATER SUPPLY WATERSHED.
REPORT POLLUTION! TOLL-FREE HOTLINE #
This hotline should be answered by a public liaison with
excellent communication skills. Public callers should be in-
formed of follow-up steps where appropriate.
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24. All the DEP Watershed vehicles should bear the hot-
line number, and the public should be educated about it so
they will use it. The DEP should print the hotline numbers
on the DEP fishing licenses, and post it in bait shops at fish-
ing clubs such as Theodore Gordon Fly Fishers and Water-
shed chapters of Trout Unlimited, at train stations in the
Watershed communities, and with the many environmental
groups that are interested in the Watershed.
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